# 2NC---Dartmouth---Round 6

## CP---Advantage

### Solvency---2NC

## DA---EU

### Leadership---Impact---2NC

#### Threats are proliferating and global---existential war, rogue tech, and climate breakdown are each inevitable absent EU assertiveness.

Balfour ’24 [Rosa and Sinan Ulgen; November 2024; Director of Carnegie Europe, Ph.D. in International Relations from the London School of Economics and Political Science; Senior Fellow, M.A. from the College of Europe; Geopolitics and Economic Statecraft in the European Union, “Introduction,” Ch. 1]

At that time, economics served the broad geopolitical goal of supporting the post–Cold War order in Europe—just as it had supported the post–World War II order. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, projecting the European model worldwide became the external corollary to the EU’s internal success: The prevailing liberal, rules-based approach to international economic relations helped defuse tensions and regulate global politics.

Thirty years later, the EU’s strength has turned into a liability. There is now a drive toward a politicization of the international economy, while rising geopolitical tensions impact on economics, security, and technology at a time when European countries are transitioning toward a green and digital economy. Rather than a conduit for cooperation, economic interdependence has become subjected to weaponization. Together, several factors are challenging the world in which European integration was possible: the unraveling of the neoliberal order, the “fuzzy bifurcation” between globalization and geopolitics (according to political scientist Richard Higgott), war in Europe and the Middle East, and the simultaneous trends of accelerated technological change and the climate crisis.

The EU’s Political Economic Model Under Threat

War in Europe and great-power rivalry are laying bare the weaknesses of the EU’s political economic model and imposing harsh choices on states. Multilateral institutions, unable to accommodate emerging demands for reform, stand by as international norms and rules are belittled, ignored, or politicized. This situation has polarizing effects on global public opinion and leaves the international order contested by both revisionist states and political actors in societies.

In a conflict-prone postneoliberal world, these developments require a new examination of the global ambitions and strategies of the EU—traditionally a weak foreign policy player but a forceful economic actor. As an experiment and a pillar of multilateralism, the EU has contributed to and benefited from the rules-based order that is now being challenged. If the EU wants to play a role in this emerging landscape, it needs to adapt its political economic model and craft an external policy fit for purpose. The task is even more daunting than it sounds, as it goes to the heart of the logic behind European integration.

Adapting to the emerging international environment may mean changing policies and approaches that have so far been carefully embedded in a set of liberal norms. Building greater European strategic autonomy and internal resilience may entail a shift away from these norms, raising questions about the EU’s global standing. Such a shift would also require far greater coherence between the union’s internal and external policies.

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The double shock of the coronavirus pandemic and Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine accelerated a preexisting trend of successive EU measures in response to hostile geopolitics. The prevailing narrative about the EU’s adaptation to global disorder frames the challenge as a choice between interdependence, on the one hand, and strategic autonomy or European sovereignty, on the other. There has been much lively debate and many policy discussions about this narrative. Running through the speeches of Europe’s political leaders and the policy documents of the EU institutions is a novel connection between security and economics, both at home and abroad. French President Emmanuel Macron, by far the union’s most intellectually engaged political leader, has spoken of a new “prosperity pact” to underpin Europe’s quest for sovereignty. Inspired by French essayist Paul Valéry’s remark at the end of World War I about the mortality of civilizations, Macron has pointed out the urgency of the endeavor, noting that because of “war and peace on our continent,” Europe can die. Launching his September 2024 report on the future of European competitiveness, former European Central Bank president Mario Draghi, too, commented on Europe’s “slow agony” should it not address its problems. The strategic agenda of the EU’s incoming leadership for 2024–2029 sets out a framework to connect an upgrade of the single market to the EU’s ability to respond to geopolitical turmoil. A string of reports that have been published—including those by Draghi, former Italian prime minister Enrico Letta, and former Finnish president Sauli Niinistö—all address aspects of these issues. In this context, this compilation is an inquiry into how the EU is adapting to the transformation of the international order. To address this overarching question, the chapters examine the challenges and dilemmas in a series of thematic areas where economic policy and foreign policy meet. Economic Means for Foreign Policy Ends The concept of economic statecraft relates to the ways in which states link economic tools to foreign policy goals. Meanwhile, geopolitics is about the ways in which geography and economics influence politics and the relations between nations. Economic statecraft can thus be seen as a response to geopolitics that uses economic means for foreign policy ends. In a historical context, economic statecraft reflects a shift away from a neoliberal doctrine and globalized economic relations toward more interventionism in the economy.

<<PARAGRAPH BREAKS RESUME>>

Prevalent debates frame the challenge within a binary understanding of autonomy versus interdependence. This compilation favors a multidimensional approach that simultaneously examines the politics of the EU and its external impacts. For Europe, having the political leadership to pursue economic statecraft means addressing questions of European unity, the balance between supranational and national powers, and the enduring risk of fragmentation. The interventionism required to strengthen the EU’s economic statecraft raises questions about the degree to which member states are willing to cooperate through EU institutions—or, conversely, the extent to which they will resist this creeping statecraft.

In the context of great-power rivalry, Erik Jones observes in the next chapter that the global economy is characterized by a competitive search for policy autonomy, in which governments look for instruments they can use to either take advantage of or push back against the need for change. For the EU, aside from its unfulfilled ambition of greater European sovereignty, there are inevitable questions about its preferred international relationships. How far will the EU tilt toward the United States and invest in the transatlantic partnership, and what room for maneuver might Europe have in its relations with China? Which preferred modes of interaction will the EU invest in: bilateral, minilateral, plurilateral, or multilateral? What normative and practical coherence is there between the EU’s internal and external policies? And, more broadly, to what extent can the EU shape the external environment and craft its own strategy, rather than respond defensively to hostile outside trends?

The following chapters in this compilation use this framework to examine how the EU is responding to the challenges to its political economic model. The compilation begins with a historical examination of the critical junctures at which the global economy has shifted into new political orders. As well as identifying the features of great historical transformation, Jones argues that the global economy is unlikely to survive the current competitive search for greater autonomy. Yet, today’s national politics place value on the pursuit of autonomy, making this quest conflictual in and of itself.

This is the background against which the EU’s economic statecraft needs to be placed. While policymakers recognize the salience of the connection between economics and security, crafting a mix of economic, foreign, and security policies is harder to achieve. As Giovanni Grevi and Richard Youngs show, European political rhetoric often emphasizes a sense of victimhood in the face of a dangerous international environment, justifying a resort to defensive measures to protect the European economy. Indeed, the EU risks too strong a focus on such a defensive agenda at the expense of a more proactive approach geared toward multilateral cooperation and the protection of international public goods.

The themes explored in this compilation are broad but substantiated by specific policy analyses. Eugenia Baroncelli and Sinan Ülgen examine a range of environmental, technological, trade, and investment policies through the prism of the new doctrine of open strategic autonomy. Lizza Bomassi and Pavi Prakash Nair present supply chain resilience as the key to understanding how the EU translates its ambitions into reality with its partners. Andreas Goldthau looks at the climate agenda through the race for clean transition materials. Raluca Csernatoni considers the EU’s quest for technological sovereignty as the framing for the evolving regulation of emerging digital technologies, artificial intelligence, and the security-technology nexus. And Catherine Hoeffler analyzes security through the EU’s role in defense-industrial policy.

All of the chapters trace recent policy developments with the goal of understanding the logics and narratives of the EU’s policy choices, the degree of continuity with the union’s past practices, the policy dilemmas and possible trade-offs, and the political consensus that may—or may not—emerge to enable the union to move forward in its economic statecraft.

Internal-External Tensions

All areas of foreign policy entail an interface between internal cohesion and external projection. For the EU, these areas require a new political consensus on key choices: between openness to the world and inward-looking protectionism, and between the existing rules of international cooperation and the search for a more restrictively defined European interest. Recent policy developments also pose questions about how the EU wants to position itself in relation to other actors—allies, rivals, new partners, and, especially, the United States—and the principle of multilateralism.

At the more mundane level of policy, the EU’s dilemmas feed into specific challenges about policy preferences and diplomatic tactics. For instance, protecting and enhancing strategic assets can collide with competition and trade policies. Meanwhile, climate transition goals might be achieved by exploiting the resources of third countries, which would go against the stated goals of the EU’s global partnerships. Europe’s task is to strengthen its autonomy while working with partners bilaterally and multilaterally toward reforming global governance.

All of the chapters in this compilation provide policy-specific insights and illuminate broader trends. The gulf between the EU’s ambition of sovereignty and the economic reality in the areas of technology, innovation, and defense is so enormous as to call into question whether the term “sovereignty” is appropriate at all. The EU’s fragmentation is a chronic feature of these policy fields, and in technology the union’s catch-up needs are huge. Cognitive gaps among stakeholders abound, including between states and the private sector when it comes to the resilience of supply chains. Here, as in defense, there are political tensions between the European level and the national level.

The choice between defensive posturing and protection of the EU’s economic model, on the one hand, and engagement with the rest of the world, on the other, is a theme running through the chapters, which point out the contradictions between the EU’s internal push for autonomy and its stated goal of multilateralism. For example, as Goldthau underlines, there is a risk that the EU’s energy transition will lead to dependency-creating import structures. Baroncelli and Ülgen capture the internal-external contradictions in several recent initiatives. While underlining that the EU can exercise choice in pursuing its goal of open strategic autonomy, they wonder whether the union will be able to chart a coherent external policy on both the economic and the ideational front.

Identifying the next iterations of the economic and conceptual dimensions of European integration is the theme of the final chapter. Rosa Balfour focuses on the political legitimacy of the fledgling EU order and unpacks the economic, political, ideological, and international features that have lent legitimacy to European integration. Balfour asks whether the EU can find a new consensus when the norms that have underpinned integration are challenged by the external environment, political trends, and policy choices.

A Global Perspective on Geopolitics and Economic Statecraft

Globalization did not bring about an end to the nation-state. The creation of global markets lifted hundreds of millions out of poverty and gave a handful of thousands extraordinary wealth. Along the way, globalization accelerated innovation, improved communication, gave rise to multinational enterprises and global value chains, and redistributed economic activity from West to East and from North to South. The transformative power of global markets is manifest. And, paradoxically, that is why the nation-state remains central to global politics.

Geoeconomics—the collection of powerful forces unleashed through the creation of global markets—has led to huge challenges of adjustment to new technologies, forms of communication, patterns of production, and locations of activity. Policymakers at all levels must address these challenges with limited resources. Doing so is necessarily a political task that involves deciding who should act and who stands to gain from specific policy choices, as well as who does not.1 The governments of nation-states—not multinational enterprises, international organizations, multilateral forums, nongovernmental organizations, or any other form of nonstate actor—remain the focal points for this kind of political agency. The more painful or difficult the adjustments are for a given society, the more central these states become.

Each national government faces different needs with different resources. Governments search for instruments they can use effectively to take advantage of the need for change, to push back against it, or to compensate those who lose out. Often that search focuses on the economic domain. National governments use their control over market and nonmarket instruments—or economic statecraft—to achieve their political objectives. Here, it is worth underscoring that economic statecraft is, and always has been, an expression of geopolitics and not of geoeconomics. Where state control over economic instruments is insufficient to the political task, governments are willing to deploy more coercive measures, including violence, both at home and abroad.

In extreme cases, where successive national governments cannot achieve their political objectives either by manipulating economic instruments or by using force, the state fails until some group emerges that is powerful enough to reenergize or replace it. In that sense, responding to geoeconomic forces is an existential requirement. Few, if any, national governments seek to undo the benefits that global markets make possible, and yet most, if not all, of them are determined to do whatever it takes to respond to the adjustment challenges those benefits entail—even if this comes at the expense of making global markets less efficient.

#### Hotspots like Eastern Europe, Taiwan, the SCS, and MENA are primed for escalation---consensus agrees EU security is a necessity.

Anghel ’25 [Veronica and Giuseppe Spatafora; February 6; Lecturer at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, Ph.D. in International Relations from the University of Bucharest; Associate Analyst on Transatlantic Relations and EU-NATO relations at the European Union Institute of Security Studies, Ph.D. in International Relations from the University of Oxford; European Union Institute for Security Studies, “Global Risks to the EU: A Blueprint to Navigate the Year Ahead,” https://www.iss.europa.eu/publications/commentary/global-risks-eu-blueprint-navigate-year-ahead] jchen

The year 2025 began with a new series of security challenges for Europe: uncertainty over the future of the transatlantic relationship, hybrid attacks across the continent, and the question of how to approach a potential ceasefire in Ukraine. In the face of these converging issues, how can EU policymakers effectively identify and prioritise the most significant threats to European interests?

To answer this question, the EUISS partnered with the European University Institute (EUI), the Trans European Policy Studies Association (TEPSA) and the European Initiative for Security Studies (EISS) to conduct a survey among European experts on the main risks to the Union in 2025. The surveyed experts are members of the EUISS, TEPSA, and EISS networks. 40% identified themselves as EU foreign policy experts, 98% hold at least a master's degree, and nearly 60% hold a PhD.

The Global Risks to the EU project, launched by the Robert Schuman Centre at the European University Institute, represents the first comprehensive, continent-wide assessment of global risk perceptions among European experts.

At the end of 2024, the survey asked close to 400 unique respondents to rank the likelihood and expected impact of 30 predefined risks affecting EU interests – defined as coherence, unity, security and prosperity. The survey aims to generate strategic foresight for EU foreign policy, analyse foreign policy alignment within the EU, and facilitate transatlantic comparisons of strategic priorities.

The top risks identified by experts range from Russia’s continued aggression to a potential US withdrawal from its security guarantees, to war in the Middle East and the Indo-Pacific. Here, we review the main risks and suggest what the EU should do to address them in a proactive way.

Appeasing Russia – in Ukraine and beyond

Experts overwhelmingly view the defeat of Ukraine as a critical threat to EU interests, with a ceasefire favourable to Russia emerging as the top risk for 2025. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and the Kremlin’s efforts to rewrite the post-Cold War order in Europe have fundamentally disrupted the EU’s security. Today, through its actions against Ukraine, Russia continues to put pressure on EU unity and policy coherence. The concern that the Trump administration could push for negotiations with Russia while bypassing Ukraine and the EU’s interests likely contributed to the high importance that the experts attached to this risk. If Moscow were to secure a favourable ceasefire in Ukraine, leaving Kyiv defenceless and without a path towards Euro-Atlantic integration, the Kremlin could rearm and launch another attack in the near future.

EU experts also identify a high risk of new Russian military action in non-NATO neighbouring states. They furthermore foresee the risks emerging from the formation of pro-Russian governments in Georgia, and potentially in Moldova. However, the experts consider the risk of a confrontation between NATO and Russia to be moderate, assessing this to be of relatively low likelihood, reflecting confidence in NATO’s capacity to deter direct Russian attacks.

US abandonment – in Europe and the Pacific

The withdrawal of American security guarantees to Europe also ranks among EU experts’ top concerns for 2025. Remarkably, in the view of these experts, US abandonment would have as high an impact on the EU as a Russian nuclear strike. This metric captures EU reliance on the United States for its security as perceived by the experts who clearly take President Donald Trump’s threat of not honouring US pledges towards NATO allies very seriously.

Moreover, experts view a direct US-China military confrontation as unlikely in the short term, despite rating the likelihood of a cross-strait conflict between China and Taiwan as moderately high and the chances of Chinese aggression in the South China Sea as extremely high. This finding suggests that, in the event of Chinese aggression against US allies like Taiwan or the Philippines, the Trump administration would not act decisively to defend US interests in the region in 2025. However, EU experts acknowledge the significant impact that a potential US-China conflict would have on EU interests, reflecting the far-reaching influence of great power competition on global stability, EU security and economic prosperity.

Hybrid and cyber threats

Experts rank the risk of disruptive hybrid attacks on EU infrastructure among the top threats to EU interests in 2025. Their assessment aligns with reports pointing to a heightened cybersecurity threat, driven by increased activity from hacktivists, cybercriminals and state-sponsored groups, especially since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

Additionally, the response reflects the growing frequency of physical attacks on critical infrastructure such as sabotaging subsea cables or burning ammunition factories. While direct conflict between NATO and Russia remains a lower-likelihood risk, European experts see a large-scale hybrid attack as having a moderate likelihood of occurring and of constituting a high-impact threat.

No durable peace in the Middle East

Experts predict that a lasting ceasefire between Israel and Hamas is unlikely in 2025, ranking the ongoing conflict as one of the top risks to EU interests. Although a fragile ceasefire was brokered in January 2025, the absence of a long-term strategy to forge peace between the two sides will sustain high levels of tension. According to experts, this conflict will continue to strain the unity and coherence of EU policy in the Middle East. They also acknowledge the potential risk of a large-scale military confrontation between Iran and Israel, which they view as moderately likely to occur and believe would be highly impactful on EU interests.

In the Middle East geopolitical landscape, experts rank the collapse of the state of Lebanon as highly likely, though with moderate repercussions on EU interests. However, any of these conflicts could trigger large-scale migration towards the EU, which is seen as a high-risk scenario that would have a major impact on the continent.

Faced with this gloomy picture, the EU has two choices: to despair, or to act.

The Global Risks to the EU survey reveals overwhelming consensus among experts – across academia, think tanks, and policymaking circles – on the top issues affecting EU interests. On average, policymakers and think tankers express slightly more concern than academics.

The main risks are also recognised across the territory of the Union. Although there was once a divide between Eastern and Western Europe regarding the threat posed by Russia, Moscow’s belligerence has now unified expert opinion. The lack of significant differences between respondents from different regions suggests that Europeans might be overcoming long-term divergences in threat perception. This unity of views presents an opportunity that the EU should not waste.

Here are some ways in which the EU can start tackling the global risks with which it is confronted in 2025:

Prevent a bad deal

An unfavourable ceasefire imposed on Ukraine is the highest risk – but the range of potential negotiation outcomes could vary. The EU must be clear-eyed: if negotiations do begin, Kyiv’s battlefield strength and ability to deter future Russian attacks will determine its bargaining power. The EU must do everything in its power to ensure that Ukraine has the resources and support needed to sustain its defence at the required scale and strength. That will require working primarily at supranational level, but equally at the level of all 27 Member States, with key partners, and also in coalition-of-the-willing formats if there is no consensus.

A comprehensive Russia strategy

Developing a coherent strategy for the EU’s future dealings with Russia is crucial for European security. The EU must forge a coherent and unified political, economic and military posture towards an autocratic belligerent neighbour, one that will endure beyond any potential ceasefire in Ukraine. That strategy should emphasise the need to isolate Russia from the EU’s economy and deter the Kremlin from launching future attacks. The survey indicates that Russia is less likely to use nuclear weapons than the Kremlin’s red-line threats suggest. While the EU should not entirely dismiss these warnings, it must be prepared to take more decisive action against Moscow – especially since experts do not foresee a regime change in Russia anytime soon.

Spend big on defence

If US abandonment of Europe constitutes a threat of nuclear proportions, Europeans must allocate the appropriate resources to address it. A major increase in defence spending in the first half of 2025 – ahead of the NATO summit – will send a strong signal to the US that Europe is serious about defending itself, together with Washington, but alone if necessary. The EU should leverage the upcoming White Paper on the future of European defence to provide the right incentives to support Member States in this effort. The White Paper should focus on building an integrated European defence market with emphasis on joint procurement, proposing a coordinated rearmament strategy, and supporting defence purchases outside the EU to cover immediate shortfalls.

Go on the cyber-hybrid offensive

The growing number of attacks on European critical infrastructure shows that the current approach is not deterring the Kremlin and its allies – which makes this risk so particularly high. The EU should take a more offensive approach to impose costs on its adversaries, encompassing both deterrence by denial (better protection of infrastructure and early warning) and by punishment (going after the perpetrators).

Think across theatres and partners

The survey reveals that crises and risks can move across theatres. The EU’s geographically closest partners, such as the UK or countries in the Western Balkans, face a similar set of risks. US abandonment, experts say, would be felt in Europe but also in the Indo-Pacific. Conflict in the latter region (South China Sea, Taiwan) would reverberate in Europe as well. Hence, this is not the time for parochial thinking. The EU should promote a common vision with both nearby and distant partners to deal with shared threats. Specifically, the EU must prioritise a clear and coherent vision regarding China’s role in its future economic and security strategies, making it a central focus of its agenda.

Don’t overlook other crises

Even as the EU zeroes in on its most critical threats, it cannot afford to retreat from the world. A recent survey reveals a tangled web of risks: a fragile Middle East ceasefire could collapse, potentially igniting a broader conflict with Iran. Meanwhile, while conflicts on the African continent – in Libya, Sudan, Ethiopia, the DRC or Mozambique – may seem remote, they still rank high on the risk scale, and any escalation could spur significant migration flows into Europe. With its military and civilian missions already established across conflict zones, the EU is well-positioned to project force and tackle the root causes of instability. This presents it with an opportunity to strengthen its global engagement.

### Leadership---Impact---AT: EU Fails---2NC

#### The alliance is forward-looking, adaptive, and transcends internal disagreements---effectiveness is recently verified AND self-reinforcing.

Riddervold ’24 [Marriane and Pernille Rieker; September 16; Associate Professor at Inland Norway University of Applied Sciences, a Senior Fellow at UC Berkeley Institute of European Studies; Senior Researcher at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs; European Security, “Finally Coming of Age? EU Foreign and Security Policy After Ukraine,” vol. 33]

The EU’s response to the war on Ukraine represents a shift along all of Hill’s three dimensions. In spite of discussions and remaining disagreements both in terms of interests and perceptions (see Michaels and Sus Citation2024 this volume), the member states have made a number of unanimous decisions that were perceived as difficult before the war. They have increased or agreed to spend new EU resources, and the EU has for the first time drawn on and combined the big number of different foreign policy instruments it has at its disposal (for a more in-depth discussion of the EU’s institutional structure, see Morgenstern-Pomorski Citation2024 this volume).

The member states decided on the first package of sanctions already the day before the invasion (February 23, 2022). This was in response to the fact that Russia recognised Donetsk and Luhansk as independent states and decided to send in troops. Since then, the EU, in close cooperation with the US, has followed up with several sanctions’ packages.Footnote3 On certain sanctions, not least gas imports, it was more difficult to achieve unity. Member states have also gained certain exemptions from sanctions to protect national interests. The result has, however, been a ban on the import of oil and coal, a considerable reduction in gas imports from Russia, and the launch of “RePowerEU,” an EU action plan which aims to make the EU independent of Russian gas by 2030 (European Commission Citation2022). The EU has also coordinated deliveries of weapons to Ukraine, primarily through the European Peace Facility (EPF), following an initiative headed by the EU's High Representative Borrell (Council of the EU Citation2022a). With this, several member states have broken with their own doctrines of not sending weapons to countries at war. The European Peace Facility is financed through contributions from EU member states and thus also shows an increased willingness to spend more resources. The EU budget does not permit aid in the form of military weapons; hence the fund is outside the EU common budget but is coordinated by the EU. It is the first time that the EU finances weapons deliveries to a third country from a common fund – a role many would have thought impossible for the EU to assume prior to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The EPF also funds a CSDP-mission dedicated to the training of Ukrainian troops. Although the idea of a training mission was not new, and several EU member states already trained Ukrainian soldiers bilaterally before 2022, the member states disagreed over whether and how this should be done collectively within the framework of the EU. Russia’s full scale invasion sparked urgency to the matter, and EU defence ministers agreed in August 2022 that preparatory work could start (Council of the EU Citation2022c). In the fall 2023, the member states also agreed to the Commission’s proposal for an Act in Support of Ammunition Production (ASAP), which funds increased ammunition production in the EU and Norway through the EU budget (Council of the EU Citation2023a). In the words of Costa and Barbé (Citation2023, p. 442) “the EU has effectively taken decisions in the field of defence capabilities that have defied expectations”. The EU member states also agreed on other key decisions: For the first time activating the Temporary Protection Directive (Council of the EU Citation2022b), the borders to Ukraine were opened for Ukrainian refugees to enter the EU. In June 2022, Ukraine was given candidate status (European Council Citation2022c) and in November 2023 the Commission presented a plan for enlargement, suggesting to also open negotiations talks (European Commission Citation2023g), This was accepted by the European Council in December 2023. This thus also presents a clear shift in EU policies from before the Russian invasion, as enlargement had experienced little progress for years due to fierce resistance from many countries, including France.

Member states have also agreed on a long series of new measures that improve the security and resilience of the Union itself and its member states. The strategic compass was adopted less than a month after the invasion and although it had been prepared for some time, it was rewritten due to the invasion (EEAS Citation2022). The invasion has also made the member states more committed to deliver on their promises in this field. Examples include new space and cyber initiatives (European Commission Citation2023b, Citation2023d, Citation2023e) and various measures to strengthen the Union’s economic security (European Commission Citation2023c), energy (European Commission Citation2022) and food securityFootnote4 (European Council Citation2022a) or access to critical raw-materials (European Commission Citation2023h).

This development towards a better decision-making capacity and a stronger ability to combine different instruments is evident in how the EU’s executive, the European Commission, has taken on a much bigger role in EU foreign policy, including in EU security and defence. Longer term, we have seen a development that has made the EU institutions, such as the Commission and the EEAS, more important as drivers of closer cooperation and more integration in the CFSP, as well as contributing to the Union’s foreign policy actorness with other instruments. These institutions are often the first to identify the problem and suggest a solution for the member states to consider (Cross Citation2017, Riddervold et al. Citation2021, Radealli Citation2022) – a trend that has intensified following the war and its many consequences for the EU. This is not to say that policy-areas necessarily formally have become more supranational. To the contrary – the member states according to some studies increased their influence over EU integration following the war on Ukraine (Genschel et al. Citation2023).

This said, the war has strengthened a trend where the Commission de facto plays a bigger role in EU foreign policy than the treaties suggest (Håkansson Citation2023, Sus Citation2024, Riddervold and Rosén Citation2026). One key reason is the now much stronger link between security policies and other policy areas where the EU has more competences than in the CFSP. A more uncertain international environment and the Ukraine war have led to a securitisation of numerous other policy areas, such as enlargement, energy, development, industry and common market and trade policies, where these other domains increasingly also are used for foreign policy purposes. In the broader area of foreign policy, the Commission plays an important role through its instruments in the area of “external relations” where the EU has either full (as in trade policy) or shared competences (as in areas such as humanitarian aid). However, both within the CFSP and other policy areas, we see a trend where the Commission has been given a more important role. This is the case with regard to the European Defence Fund (EDF), for instance, which aims to stimulate defence industrial cooperation through various financial incentives. On top of this, Member States increasingly delegate some authority to the Commission to ensure more effective implementation of various preparedness and crisis-management tasks (often referred to as coordination mechanisms). This entails that the Commission has a lower degree of competence and authority, but often a rather comprehensive role regardless – both as a coordinator and as an implementing force. Among the EU’s responses to the war in Ukraine, such mechanisms have been activated in the area of civil emergency preparedness (RescEU), which has made the EU capable of delivering the largest and most complex EU civil protection operation since the creation of this mechanism in 2013. Beyond this, the Commission is also building up a greater coordinating role in the field of cyber security (European Commission Citation2020, Citation2023e), space security (European Commission Citation2023d) as well as in areas linked to economic security with mechanisms for screening of foreign direct investments (FDI) and anti-coercion (European Commission Citation2023c). Finally, the Commission has a crucial coordinating role for example in the enlargement process, which is now rebooted and returned to the top of the Union’s agenda for the years to come.

In sum, the EU’s response to the war on Ukraine illustrates that the EU has developed an increased capacity to make decisions rapidly when needed, provide the resources to fund them, and finally, combine the various instruments that the EU has at its disposal. The Union’s response has been both rapid and multi-faceted. It has consisted of measures that punish Russia, that support Ukraine financially, militarily and politically, and on top of this, the EU has taken many steps towards improving the security and resilience of the Union and its member states. And it has taken measures that aim at mitigating the negative global implications of the crisis, such as the global food shortage.

This increased decision-making capacity is linked both to an increased willingness amongst the member states to solve common challenges within the EU framework, and to the EU executive, the Commission, taking on a more leading role. This does not, however, mean that there is no disagreement in the EU on the EU’s foreign policy responses in different policy domains, nor that the EU always will respond coherently and forcefully to all foreign policy crises facing it. To the contrary, many of the EU’s responses to the war were compromises, and the EU’s lack of clear and common response to the war in Gaza after October 7 2023 shows that even extensive decision-making capacity in response to Ukraine doesn’t automatically travel to other topics on the EU’s broad foreign policy agenda. However, at the very least, the EU’s response to the war on Ukraine suggests that it has reached a stage where it, when faced with a crisis that is perceived as existential to the EU, it is able to take quick decisions, draw on various instruments, and agree on an increase in resources. This suggests that the EU has the tools, the processes and the capacities when the will is there, and that certain crises increase the likelihood that this will be activated. From previous studies we also know that the EU learns from one crisis to the next, and that the ability to agree to common solutions increases over time (Riddervold et al. Citation2021), suggesting that the EU over time may be more able to agree also in future crises. While member states previously discussed if they should respond jointly to a crisis, the main approach today is not to discuss “if” but “how” they jointly should address a common challenge.

3.2. Towards EU maturity in its foreign policy identity

The EU maturation process in response to the Ukraine crisis is also evident in how the EU’s identity as a principled pragmatist that is increasingly focused on crisis-management and resilience now plays out in its policies, actions and statements.

Studies on the EU’s foreign policy identity have traditionally been dominated by discussions on whether it is a normative actor and a multilateralist (Manners Citation2002, Kissack Citation2010) or a more realist, strategic and sometimes tragic actor (Hyde-Price Citation2008, Toje Citation2011). Realist perspectives attracted renewed attention after the 2014 Russian annexation of Crimea (Macfarlane and Menon Citation2014). An increased focus on interests is also reflected in the EU’s Global Strategy from 2016, where the EU introduced concepts such as “principled pragmatism” and “resilience”. (EEAS Citation2016). Together with the “Geopolitical Commission” agenda that has been promoted since 2019 (von der Leyen Citation2019), this sparked a new debate on the EU’s foreign policy identity. A number of these studies focus on whether the EU’s new emphasis on resilience and geopolitics is undermining its normative foreign policy agenda (Dijkstra Citation2016, Joseph and Juncos Citation2019, Giske Citation2021), or how these concepts translate into specific foreign policy practices (Adler-Nissen Citation2016). Following Rieker and Blockmans (Citation2021, p. 463), however, “neither a realist strategic-actor model nor a normative foreign-power model can fully capture the characteristics of EU foreign policies in today’s changing international environment”. Instead, to conceptualise the inherent duality in the EU’s principled pragmatism approach, they argue that the EU increasingly combines interests and norms in a systematic way. By introducing the perception of urgency in response to a crisis or threat (Cross Citation2021), they find that there is a pattern to when the EU operates according to its normative foundation and when a more interest-based logic kicks in. While the EU continues to be principled in its overarching foreign and security policy, it has increasingly become more interest-based and strategic in dealing with situations that are perceived as immediate and urgent crises, in particular in its neighbourhood (Rieker and Riddervold Citation2022). This also plays out in a duality in the concept of resilience, where the EU’s aim is to preserve and strengthen a liberal, rules based world order also for the sake of stability in a volatile context (Joseph and Juncos Citation2019), but when an event or situation is perceived as a threat to the EU’s more immediate security, the EU is more prone to focus on its short-term strategic interests.

While this in practice may often be a hard balance to reach, this principled pragmatic pattern of combining short-term self-interests and longer-term normative goals is also evident in the EU’s response to the war on Ukraine. On the one hand, the EU has been very clear on the normative foundation of its response, which was also the case after the annexation of Crimea in 2014. Sjursen and Rosen (Citation2017, p. 13) find that in spite of diverging interests and the costs of imposing sanctions, after 2014, “Member States accepted the political and economic costs of sanctioning Russia due to a sense of collective commitment to the principles of sovereignty and self-determination”. The same type of normative justification is also very evident in the 2022 justifications for the EU’s response:

By its unprovoked and unjustified military actions, Russia is grossly violating international law and undermining European and global security and stability (…) The EU stands firmly by Ukraine and its people as they face this war. (European Council Citation2022a)

It also illustrates the Union’s determination to act because the invasion was such a clear breach of the UN charter and international law, and thereby also the basic principles that the EU is built on (art. 3 in TEU). Supporting and strengthening the liberal world order forms the core of the EU’s overall foreign policy strategy, while Russia’s actions suggest a return to a completely different international order, based on power rather than rules. In a joint statement from the president of the Council, Charles Michel, and the President of the Commission, Von der Leyen they clearly state that:

We deplore the loss of life and humanitarian suffering. The EU and its Member States are ready to urgently provide humanitarian emergency response. We call on Russia and Russia-backed armed formations to respect international humanitarian law. (European Council Citation2022b)

Also, several other studies point to this last point as a main explanation for why the EU responded so rapidly to Russia’s full-scale invasion (Adler Citation2022, Bosse Citation2022, Maurer et al. Citation2022).

On the other hand, these more normative considerations are explicitly combined with reference to European security. When the Union has been able to act so rapidly and decisively in response to this invasion, it is because the situation was perceived as an existential threat also to the Union itself and its member states. This also explains why the response also came faster than most would have predicted (also see Orenstein Citation2023).

The renewed salience of enlargement must also be viewed as a policy that is driven by both security interests and normative considerations. Following the Russian invasion, even enlargement-sceptic EU member states have changed their approach radically, as showcased by French president Emmanuel Macron comment on 1 June 2022 that “we must remove the ambiguities and agree to have a Union which is enlarged, which is geopolitical” (Elysée Citation2023).

Due to the war EU member states show that they are increasingly willing to accept the cost of enlarging the EU to include a state, like Ukraine. This change is driven not only by a commitment to stand up for the respect of international law, but also because enlargement is crucial for preserving European security more broadly. How von der Leyen presents the importance of enlargement is a good illustration:

In times where we see the rules-based international order increasingly called into question, of course a larger and stronger European Union gives us a stronger voice in the world. In sum, enlargement is a unique opportunity both for the countries aspiring to join the European Union and, of course, for us. It is a driver for peace and prosperity that make our Union so special. (von der Leyen Citation2023)

The EU’s dual principled pragmatic approach is evident also in how perceptions of urgency and short-term security interests clearly have influenced other aspects of the EU’s total response, in particular in how it plays out in its role as a security provider in the broader sense, and in particular its role as a crisis-manager and provider of European resilience.

Resilience seems to be the main justification for most of the EU’s new preparedness and crisis-response mechanisms. We see this for example in the Strategic Compass, where increased resilience is linked to everything from cyber to energy (EEAS Citation2022). As already shown above, this has also been followed up by an economic security strategy and various measures to ensure European security in various fields (European Commission Citation2022, Citation2023b, Citation2023c, Citation2023d, Citation2023e, Citation2023f, Citation2023g, Citation2023h).

In sum, the EU’s response to the war strengthens the argument that the EU is a principled pragmatist who systematically combines norms and interests in its foreign policies. Without claiming to say anything about the normative legitimacy of such an approach, the fact that this pattern is now more stable and systematic over time, thus suggests that the EU has become a more mature actor on the identity dimension. On the one hand, Russia’s breach of the UN charter, the risk that the consequences of the war may undermine existing, rules-based liberal order and Russia’s strong human rights violations all contribute to understanding the EU’s strong and quick response to Russia’s invasion in February 2022. At the same time, due to a perception of immediate threats the EU has also increased its focus on crisis-management and stronger resilience in response to the war, as regards the potential spill-over of war to broader security challenges.

### U---AT: General Trumper---2NC

#### Trump reverses legitimacy shortfalls---consensus is resoundingly high post-thumpers.

Polychroniou ’25 [C.J.; June 9; political scientist; Global Policy Journal, “Trump’s Animosity Is Bringing Europeans Closer Together and to the Rest of the World,” https://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/blog/09/06/2025/trumps-animosity-bringing-europeans-closer-together-and-rest-world]

The European Union came into existence in 1992 with the signing of the Maastricht Treaty, which led to a single market, border-free travel, and the euro. Since then, the E.U. has evolved in various ways, although it has stopped short of developing a centralized fiscal authority and setting up a European army. Moreover, the E.U. has long been plagued by a number of legitimacy problems that have given rise to Euroscepticism among both left-wing and right-wing citizens.

Nonetheless, certain recent global developments are forcing the E.U. to upend many long-held ideas and norms about its own security and relations with other countries. Russia’s war in Ukraine and the sudden shift in U.S. policy toward Europe have made both policymakers and citizens across the continent more aware of the need not only for deeper integration and a new European governance architecture but also of the historical necessity to create a new world order. While Russia’s war in Ukraine has forced the E.U. to rethink its energy policy and compelled countries such as Finland and Sweden to become full members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), it is U.S. President Donald Trump’s hostility toward Europe and its institutions that is bringing Europeans closer together and even making them realize that the E.U. is a safe haven when all is said and done.

Indeed, the latest Eurobarometer survey, which was released on May 27, 2025, reveals the highest level of trust in the E.U. in nearly two decades and the highest support ever for the common currency. The overwhelming majority of respondents also displayed support for a common defense system among E.U. member states and opposition to tariffs. Equally impressive is the fact that a huge majority agreed that the E.U. is “a place of stability in a troubled world.”

These findings come just days after Trump told a rally in West Mifflin, Pennsylvania that he will double tariffs on steel and aluminum imports to 50%. This move, which will take effect on June 4, prompted the European Commission to announce that Europe is prepared to roll out countermeasures in order to retaliate against President Trump’s plan to increase steel and aluminum tariffs. It said that it “strongly” regrets Trump’s threat and that “if no mutually acceptable solution is reached both existing and additional E.U. measures will automatically take effect on July 14—or earlier, if circumstances require.”

The concern among many Europeans is that U.S.-E.U. relations are not only seriously damaged but that the U.S. has now become Europe’s enemy. Since coming to office, Trump has launched an active campaign against European democracy, with members of his administration not only bashing Europe but openly supporting far-right parties across the continent.

The common perception about Europe is that it is indecisive, too slow to act, even when major crises come knocking at its door. There is an element of truth in that, as the E.U. has shown a proclivity for reactive rather than proactive political behavior. But the Trump shock appears to be rousing Europe from its geopolitical slumber. The E.U. is standing up to the bully in Washington and is looking after Europe’s own interests with greater zeal than ever before. This is because there is indeed an emerging consensus among European policymakers and experts alike that Trump wants to do to Europe what he is doing to the U.S.--i.e., destroy its civil society. MAGA hates Europe for cultural and political reasons. For Trump, as Célia Belin, senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations and head of the Paris office, aptly put it, “Europeans are an extension of his political opposition at home... and Europe is thus a symbol of the political ideals [that] Trump seeks to eliminate, transform, and subjugate.”

In its attempts to find a new role in world affairs in the Trump era, Europe is not merely reacting to Washington’s whims but seeks to implement policies that reinforce its own strategic autonomy, both internally and externally. The European Commission has updated its industrial strategy by speeding up clean energy and pursuing new trade agreements with reliable partners. While some European leaders see both Russia and China as representing a threat to the rules-based international order, there have been numerous calls by various policymakers across the continent for a closer collaboration between China and the E.U. in light of “Trump’s ‘mafia-like’ tactics.” European Union leaders will travel for a high-stakes summit to Beijing in July after failing to convince Chinese President Xi Jinping to visit Brussels for a summit marking the 50th anniversary of E.U.-China diplomatic relations. And France has called for a stronger E.U.-China alignment on climate action amid the U.S.’ withdrawal from the Paris agreement.

China is the E.U.’s second-largest trading partner. Europe is, in fact, not only growing more dependent on China for manufactured goods but, in spite of differences in bilateral relations, such as China’s position on the war in Ukraine, is actually warming up to the idea that the E.U.-China relationship is an essential vehicle for tackling global challenges and safeguarding international multilateralism.

Europe is also looking into other regions of the world as part of a concerted effort to promote ever more vigorously its own strategic autonomy. Since Trump took office, the E.U. concluded a free trade agreement with Mercosur, an economic bloc made up of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Bolivia, with scores of other countries (among them are Chile, Columbia, Ecuador, and Peru) as associate members. Mercosur, or the Southern Common Market, is the fifth-largest economy and encompasses more than 285 million people.

The E.U.-Mercosur agreement, which had been in the making for 25 years, still needs to be ratified, and Argentina’s far-right Milei government, which is in close political-ideological alignment with the Trump administration, could prove to be a stumbling block to its ratification. Argentinian President Javier Milei is, in fact, more interested in signing a free trade agreement with the United States, which would be in violation of Mercosur regulations.

After many years of negotiations, the E.U. is also close to finalizing a free trade agreement with India. The 11th round of negotiations between India and the E.U. concluded on May 16, and there is a firm commitment by both sides to strike a deal by the end of 2025. As European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said, this agreement would be “the largest deal of its kind anywhere in the world.”

If ratified, the E.U.-Mercosur free trade agreement will create a market of around 800 million people. When finalized, the E.U.-India free trade agreement will create a market of close to 2 billion consumers.

Trump is trying to remake the United States in his own image and also to destroy the E.U., which he says is “nastier than China.” One would like to believe that it is probably unlikely that he will succeed in remaking the U.S. in his own nasty image, but it is positively certain that he will not succeed in destroying Europe and its institutions, even though there is a lot that needs to be done to create a fairer and more inclusive Europe. In the meantime, however, Trump’s “mafia-like tactics” are bringing Europeans closer together and the continent ever closer to other regions of the world.

#### Aggressive unilateralism sharpens every metric of continental unity.

Smialek ’25 [Jenna; July 21; reporter covering the federal reserve and U.S. economy, M.B.A. from the New York University Stern School; New York Times, “How Trump Is Bringing Europe Together Again,” https://www.nytimes.com/2025/07/21/world/europe/trump-europe-unity-eu-tariffs.html]

President Trump’s pledge to “Make America Great Again” appears to be having an unexpected side effect: He is bringing Europeans together again.

The European Union was in bad shape at the start of the first Trump administration. Public trust in the bloc was at a historic low, Britain had just voted to leave, and the European economy was struggling to recover from the global financial crisis, which had set off a series of debt-related meltdowns across the continent.

But things slowly started to improve from around 2016. In recent months, sentiment around the European Union has picked up further. Trust ratings are approaching a two-decade high. E.U. leaders are striking trade deals with fast-growing economies like Indonesia, standing up a defense plan that has garnered partnerships with nations including Canada, and even Britain recently struck a deal to reset relations.

The bloc still has very real problems. Its population is aging and economic growth remains slow. Populist detractors who criticize it loudly have been gaining momentum, and it is grasping for ways to revitalize competitiveness. Ursula von der Leyen, the president of the European Commission, the European Union’s executive arm, has come under fierce criticism as she tries to overhaul the bloc’s budget.

But even in member states like Denmark, which has long been skeptical of the European Union’s budget and border policies, feelings toward the bloc have turned decidedly more positive.

“Support toward the E.U. has never been higher,” Marie Bjerre, Denmark’s minister for European Affairs, said in an interview.

Image

Donald Trump, wearing a dark suit and a red hat with the words “Make America Great Again,” walks between saluting soldiers.

President Trump has promised to “Make America Great Again,” which has included threatening allies, including the European Union, with high tariffs.Credit...Kenny Holston/The New York Times

About 74 percent of Danes said that they trusted the European Union in a recent public opinion survey conducted for the European Commission, up from 63 percent five years ago. That shift is far from isolated — across member states, citizens are feeling more trusting toward the European Union, continuing a trend that outside polls have found.

The turnaround is not solely because of Mr. Trump. The bloc’s work in organizing a response to the coronavirus pandemic, including securing vaccines, helped to bolster its popularity. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 illustrated to many European governments and citizens that their own national security could come under threat.

Yet America’s recent tone toward its longtime allies has also clearly helped to contribute to what Jörn Fleck, a senior director of the Atlantic Council, a think tank, calls a “rally around the European Union flag.”

“We have always had a very strong relationship with the U.S.,” Ms. Bjerre explained. “Now, we are met with unjustified tariffs, and we are even accused of not being a good ally. And of course that resonates, and that is why we’re turning a lot to the E.U.”

Who Has Better Leadership?

The number of E.U. countries where people approve of American leadership more than the bloc's own has sharply declined.

An E.U. or U.S. lead means that its leadership was at least 6 percentage points higher. Luxembourg was not surveyed in 2024.•Source: Gallup•By The New York Times

Since taking office in January, Mr. Trump has threatened to invade Greenland, a semiautonomous territory of Denmark. His administration has called Europeans “pathetic” in leaked exchanges on Signal, the messaging app. Mr. Trump himself has said the bloc was formed to “screw” America.

The president has slapped higher tariffs on European goods, and this month, he threatened to impose a new 30 percent across-the-board levy that European officials warned would hobble trans-Atlantic trade.

Image

A woman answers questions from reporters holding out microphones and recording devices.

“Support toward the E.U. has never been higher,” said Marie Bjerre, Denmark’s minister for European Affairs.Credit...Omar Havana/Associated Press

Mr. Trump has also demanded that Europe do more to pay for its own defense, and has suggested that the United States would not come to the aid of countries that he felt were not contributing enough to their own security.

All of that has pushed Europe further from America — and closer together.

“There’s a creeping awareness that all of the European countries are small at the end of the day,” Mr. Fleck said. “That Europe needs to stick together and pool resources.”

He noted that the rehabilitation of Europe’s image has taken time, and was down to many factors.

In the face of Russia’s increased aggression and America’s insistence that European governments do more on defense, E.U. member states are trying to rapidly step up their military spending. But as countries have struggled to find room in their strapped national budgets to ramp up drone and howitzer purchases, the European Union has stepped in.

E.U. officials unveiled in March a 150 billion euro — about $175 billion — joint procurement loan plan, through which member states can use borrowing backed by Brussels to boost military ability. They also announced that the bloc would give states wiggle room under their budget rules to allow them to increase defense spending.

Individual states within the European Union have also become cozier: Germany and France are collaborating more tightly, especially following the election in May of Friedrich Merz as Germany’s new chancellor. Even Britain, which formally left the bloc in 2020, has pushed to be included in the E.U. joint defense procurement plan.

The shared interest in increasing Europe’s defenses is not the only issue that is bolstering Brussels’ brand. When it comes to Mr. Trump’s trade threats, the European Union is playing an even

The European Commission negotiates trade deals for all 27 member states. By acting together as the world’s third-largest economy, the bloc has more power than any of its individual countries would have on their own.

While there were initially questions about whether some European states might try to cut side deals with the United States — and Trump administration officials have bemoaned that they cannot talk directly with Germany or other individual governments — European officials have mainly stuck together.

Consider Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni of Italy. Given her roots in the far right and history of criticizing the European Union, she was initially expected to position herself as an ally of Mr. Trump. Yet not only did she avoid an Italy-first approach when she visited the White House in April, she has maintained what many see as a pro-Europe tone since.

Ms. Meloni’s reaction to Mr. Trump’s 30 percent tariff threat was a case in point. “Europe has the economic and financial strength to assert its position and secure a fair and reasonable agreement,” she wrote on social media last week. “Italy will do its part.”

Ms. von der Leyen has also been pitching the benefits of Europe to outside partners, working to sign a flurry of new or improved trade agreements with countries including Mexico, South Korea and Indonesia.

“We in Southeast Asia, especially Indonesia, we really consider Europe to be very, very important in providing global stability,” President Prabowo Subianto of Indonesia said last week at a news conference in Brussels, at which he appeared alongside Ms. von der Leyen.

As President Trump has stepped up his anti-European messaging, Ursula von der Leyen, the president of the European Commission, has sought to build ties with other states. Credit...Jean-Christophe Verhaegen/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images

### Link---2NC

#### 1. RETRENCHMENT.

#### Coherent U.S. foreign policy crowds out EU autonomy.

Sánchez ’25 [Nil Delgado; August 17; International Affairs Writer, European Relations; “The Illusion of European Autonomy:  How U.S. Foreign Policy Shaped EU Dependence,” https://europeanrelations.com/the-illusion-of-european-autonomy/]

Path towards autonomy

These recent episodes clearly demonstrate the European Union’s lack of genuine autonomy, revealing its deep dependence on the United States’ foreign policy. This dependency has not gone unnoticed by several European leaders and politicians, some of whom have raised their concerns regarding American dominance and the constraints it places on Europe’s strategic independence.

French Prime Minister Emmanuel Macron has been one of the leading voices of this movement for the past years. In 2018, he called for the creation of a “true European Army” in order to stop depending on the United States for defence and security issues. The proposal gained support from prominent figures, including former German Chancellor Angela Merkel. However, despite this initial momentum, the project stalled politically, and no little concrete progress has been made since.

Another key advocate for an autonomous Europe is Josep Borrell, the former High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. Throughout his tenure as the High Representative, he repeatedly urged the EU to stop outsourcing its geopolitical responsibilities to Washington. In his own words, he argued for the EU to start being a “player, not the playground” of geopolitics. This attempt, however, was also in vain.

Although some steps have been taken to transform the EU into a “geopolitical power”, as Ursula von der Leyen pledged during her inaugural speech in 2019, these efforts have so far fallen short. The EU still lacks the “European sovereignty” envisioned by Macron.  Its limited geopolitical power continues to hinder the development of an independent foreign policy, leaving the Union unable to effectively defend its interests on the global stage.

In an era of escalating geopolitical tensions and military conflicts, the European Union must act decisively if it wishes to maintain its international relevance. It needs to start developing a serious and coherent plan to achieve full independence from external powers, and thus develop a European Foreign Policy strategy that truly defends the geopolitical and geoeconomic interests of Europe.

#### Drawing down America’s military catalyzes European self-sufficiency.

Kavanagh ’25 [Jennifer; January 10 (derived from page source); PhD, senior fellow and director of military analysis and Defense Priorities; Defense Priorities, "Realistic recommendations for Trump II," https://www.defensepriorities.org/symposia/realistic-recommendations-for-trump-ii/]

Though nuclear weapons mean that Moscow will never be irrelevant, the economic and military threat Russia poses to the United States and its interests is limited. Washington does not want to see Russia overrun Europe, but the Ukraine war has demonstrated Russia’s weakness and offered evidence that Europe could defend itself, even without U.S. support. Large U.S. deployments in Europe, then, unnecessarily drain U.S. readiness and resources needed elsewhere.

Second, removing a substantial number of U.S. forces would send a clear signal that Trump is serious about shifting the burden of Europe’s defense to the region itself. Trump is not the first president to bemoan the underspending of NATO allies. However, because the United States has always rescued Europe in times of crisis, warnings about the limits of U.S. support have no credibility. Only a sizable and quick withdrawal will catalyze long-needed changes to Europe’s defense spending and the development of a truly European defense concept and posture. Notably, in the rare instances when the United States has left allies facing a worsening security environment to respond on their own, they have stepped up their defense spending.

As he draws down the U.S. presence in Europe, Trump should start with the 20,000 military forces added after 2022, especially those based on NATO’s frontline. With Russia unlikely to move against NATO allies while still tied up in Ukraine, these forces are unnecessary for deterrence. Next, Trump should redeploy units and assets that could support U.S. operations in the Indo-Pacific, including some air and naval forces and some air defense and sustainment capabilities. Finally, U.S. forces that disincentivize Europe from building its own ground combat assets should return home, including U.S. Army brigade combat teams based in Poland and Germany.

Trump will face resistance in Washington and from abroad if he pursues this path. He should remind critics that the U.S. military presence in Europe was never intended to be enduring.

#### That’s empirically determinative of foreign policy success in particular---despite loyalist appointees.

Carati & Locatelli 25 [Andrea Carati, Associate Professor in Political Science and International Relations at the University of Milan, PhD Political Studies, University of Milan, Italy; and Andrea **Locatelli**, Associate Professor at the Catholic University in Milan, PhD Political Science, University of Florence, Italy; “Conclusion,” *Taming the President: Trump, the Advisory System, and the Mechanisms of US Foreign Policy Decision-Making*, De Gruyter, 8-22-2025, ISBN 9783111382852, p.146-151]

#### 2. CREDIBILITY.

#### The plan violates the otherwise robust interpretation of the One Voice doctrine, preventing Trump’s unitary approach to foreign policy.

Chachko ’25 [Elena; February 28; Assistant Professor of Law at Berkeley Law School. Scott R. Anderson. Scott R. Anderson is a fellow in Governance Studies at the Brookings Institution and a Senior Fellow in the National Security Law Program at Columbia Law School; Lawfare Media, “One Voice’ and the Trump Administration’s Conduct of Foreign Affairs," https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/one-voice--and-the-trump-administration-s-conduct-of-foreign-affairs]

Direct Implications for the Civil Service

In the realm of constitutional law, the “one voice” doctrine has generally been used to limit the extent to which other institutions—most notably, Congress and the states—can exercise control over aspects of U.S. foreign relations. But in implementing its own vision of this doctrine, the Trump administration’s executive order puts a different, more vulnerable set of targets in its sights: the foreign service officers, civil servants, and other employees that work in the Department of State and related agencies.

“All officers or employees charged with implementing the foreign policy of the United States must under Article II do so under the direction and authority of the President[,]” section 2 of the executive order states. “Failure to faithfully implement the President’s policy is grounds for professional discipline, including separation.” Section 4 then directs the secretary of state to “take appropriate action” where he determines such personnel action is warranted, or to refer the matter to the president if the individuals involved are presidentially appointed.

What exactly the executive order means by faithful implementation is far from clear. But insofar as it suggests that the president—and, through his delegated authority, the secretary of state—can take adverse personnel action against State Department employees who they determine has been inadequately faithful to the president’s policy agenda, separate and apart from actual job performance, it is in serious tension with how Congress has long structured and staffed both the Department and related agencies. And that may well be the point.

Federal laws applicable to both career civil servants and the foreign service generally require that agencies apply “merit principles” in weighing personnel actions. Agencies are also only supposed to pursue adverse actions “for such cause as will promote the efficiency of the services[,]” meaning misconduct detrimental to the agency’s work. Importantly, these laws also bar agencies from pursuing adverse actions against employees for their political affiliations or permissible political activities, because they refused to obey an order that would have required them to act unlawfully or contrary to a rule or regulation, or because they engaged in certain disclosures relating to conduct they reasonably believed to be unlawful, improper, or abusive. Yet one can imagine the Trump administration framing any number of these actions as reflecting inadequate faith in the president’s agenda and thereby warranting dismissal.

Notably, section 5 of the executive order also directs the secretary to “implement reforms in recruiting, performance, evaluation, and retention standards, and the programs of the Foreign Service Institute, to ensure a workforce that is committed to faithful implementation of the President’s foreign policy.” Yet, Congress has already established that the selection board system used to select and promote foreign service officers is to base its decisions on “the character, ability, conduct, quality of work, industry, experience, dependability, usefulness, and general performance” individuals have demonstrated, not their faithfulness to the president’s policy agenda. Similarly objective, ideologically neutral criteria are supposed to apply to the civil service as well. Neither framework lends itself to recruiting and retaining personnel on the basis of their perceived fidelity to the president’s policy agenda, at least if applied in good faith.

The authors of the executive order were well aware of these statutes. Indeed, the executive order cites them to make clear that it is addressing the same categories of federal employees to which those statutes apply. And it’s possible that the Trump administration intends for the executive order to be interpreted and implemented consistent with these longstanding statutory restrictions, in line with its boilerplate disclaimer that it should be “implemented consistent with applicable law[.]”

Yet the Trump administration’s posture towards federal employees in other contexts points to another, more likely explanation: that the “one voice” doctrine put forward by the executive order is intended to be yet another means of expanding presidential control over the bureaucracy. Trump has already made broad claims of presidential authority to remove civil servants of various stripes in the face of statutory restrictions. As one of his first actions in office, he also sought to reclassify broad swathes of the civil service under existing statutes in order to make them ineligible for most traditional civil service protections. Trump’s version of the one voice doctrine provides another avenue for arriving at the same conclusion in relation to those civil servants who help implement U.S. foreign policy: by arguing that the president’s constitutional authority to remove and control them is part and parcel of his broader constitutional authority over U.S. foreign policy.

Whether and how quickly this application of Trump’s “one voice” vision will lead to review by the courts is unclear. While terminated or sanctioned employees will almost certainly have standing to mount a legal challenge, the Trump administration has an array of other regulatory, statutory, and constitutional arguments—many of which it has already deployed in its efforts to terminate personnel at other federal agencies—that it will likely turn to before relying on the president’s authority over foreign affairs. Plaintiffs may also have to navigate sometimes glacial administrative proceedings before they can get their challenge of any wrongful personnel action against them before a federal court. That said, in cases where agency personnel are truly punished for being insufficiently faithful to the president’s agenda, these other arguments and avenues may—and arguably should—still fail to vindicate the government’s actions. And at that point, the federal courts may have no choice but to take Trump’s new claim of broad presidential authority over foreign affairs head on.

#### America’s diplomatic credibility will be crushed, creating a prime window for EU fill-in. The plan prevents long-term damage to diplomacy.

Dinkelman ’25 [John; August 14; President of the American Foreign Service Association; Foreign Policy, “Trump’s State Department Cuts Are a Self-Inflicted Wound,” https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/08/14/state-department-reform-trump-rubio-layoffs-afsa/]

Kroenig correctly noted that U.S. diplomats are the “pointy end of the spear” of U.S. foreign policy. But it is subject-matter experts in Washington who aim that spear by analyzing intelligence, assessing U.S. priorities, and directing government resources. In one fell swoop, the department’s leadership undermined their ability to do just that.

Also misleading is Kroenig’s claim that the State Department did not cut any foreign service officers based overseas. I’ve heard from laid-off officers who shared concerning stories that counter this narrative.

One officer in Turkey was managing a crucial visa operation that served applicants from Iran, Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. On July 11, they were cut off from their phone and email with no plane ticket home. That office now has no dedicated manager. Another officer was set to lead the U.S. Embassy in Tonga as chargé d’affaires—a strategically important post in the Pacific. They had travel orders and tickets in hand. But on July 11, they were out of a job, leaving the embassy in Tongo leaderless at a time when China is expanding its influence in the region.

Turkey and Tonga are not isolated cases. Around the world, key posts and offices from Senegal to China have been left leaderless in the same abrupt, damaging fashion. Even the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv—one of the highest priority posts—was not spared from cuts.

Kroenig downplayed the State Department’s 1,350 layoffs as just a sliver of an 80,000-person organization. But that number includes more than 50,000 locally hired staff overseas, who are vital to U.S. missions but not part of the Washington-based policy core. (No locally hired overseas staff were part of the July 11 layoffs, according to AFSA’s tallies.) Measured against the actual U.S.-based workforce—which numbered about 17,600 in 2024—the cuts amount to nearly 8 percent. That does more than just trim the fat—it cuts into muscle and bone. Shedding staff in this manner is the difference between a department that can still function and one that can’t.

Moreover, the Trump administration’s reform process was not deliberate. Contrary to Kroenig’s account, the department did not “work for months to get the reorganization right.” A survey of nearly 200 AFSA members who lost their jobs on July 11 revealed they were fired even after the department, in its official notification of the reorganization to Congress, stated that there would be “no significant changes” to its offices. State Department officials said suggestions were “solicited” across the agency, but the lack of transparency in the decision-making process makes us believe that all key choices were made by a small circle of insiders with little or no experience in foreign affairs or managing the department’s complex operations.

Under previous administrations, any potential Foreign Service layoffs had a clear, merit-based process that ranked employees globally on performance, tenure, foreign language ability, and military veteran status, then the hard calls were made. However, just three days before the July 11 layoffs, the Trump administration scrapped those criteria. The only thing that mattered was where an employee was assigned on May 29, directly contradicting the testimony of Michael Rigas, deputy secretary of state for management and resources, to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

The result was predictable: Seasoned officers with critical language skills—including Russian, Arabic, and Chinese—veterans with disabilities, and people already assigned to high-priority hardship posts were shown the door without consideration for their service or expertise. Imagine closing a military base and firing every soldier stationed there, regardless of rank, record, or pending assignments.

There is still time to avert the cuts’ long-term damage to the United States’ diplomatic power, but only if State Department leadership recognizes its errors and changes course now. Since the mass layoffs, the department has reversed dozens of its decisions, inviting some employees to return to their duties. This is a step in the right direction, but leadership needs to go further. If they truly believe the department is overstaffed, then they should return to the previously agreed-upon reduction-in-force rules that had been in effect for decades, demonstrate what fields are overstaffed, and proceed with their reorganization plan accordingly.

#### The EU can only overcome legitimacy issues because they’re comparatively more trustworthy than Trump.

Polychroniou ’25 [C.J.; June 9; political scientist; Global Policy Journal, “Trump’s Animosity Is Bringing Europeans Closer Together and to the Rest of the World,” https://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/blog/09/06/2025/trumps-animosity-bringing-europeans-closer-together-and-rest-world]

The European Union came into existence in 1992 with the signing of the Maastricht Treaty, which led to a single market, border-free travel, and the euro. Since then, the E.U. has evolved in various ways, although it has stopped short of developing a centralized fiscal authority and setting up a European army. Moreover, the E.U. has long been plagued by a number of legitimacy problems that have given rise to Euroscepticism among both left-wing and right-wing citizens.

Nonetheless, certain recent global developments are forcing the E.U. to upend many long-held ideas and norms about its own security and relations with other countries. Russia’s war in Ukraine and the sudden shift in U.S. policy toward Europe have made both policymakers and citizens across the continent more aware of the need not only for deeper integration and a new European governance architecture but also of the historical necessity to create a new world order. While Russia’s war in Ukraine has forced the E.U. to rethink its energy policy and compelled countries such as Finland and Sweden to become full members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), it is U.S. President Donald Trump’s hostility toward Europe and its institutions that is bringing Europeans closer together and even making them realize that the E.U. is a safe haven when all is said and done.

Indeed, the latest Eurobarometer survey, which was released on May 27, 2025, reveals the highest level of trust in the E.U. in nearly two decades and the highest support ever for the common currency. The overwhelming majority of respondents also displayed support for a common defense system among E.U. member states and opposition to tariffs. Equally impressive is the fact that a huge majority agreed that the E.U. is “a place of stability in a troubled world.”

These findings come just days after Trump told a rally in West Mifflin, Pennsylvania that he will double tariffs on steel and aluminum imports to 50%. This move, which will take effect on June 4, prompted the European Commission to announce that Europe is prepared to roll out countermeasures in order to retaliate against President Trump’s plan to increase steel and aluminum tariffs. It said that it “strongly” regrets Trump’s threat and that “if no mutually acceptable solution is reached both existing and additional E.U. measures will automatically take effect on July 14—or earlier, if circumstances require.”

The concern among many Europeans is that U.S.-E.U. relations are not only seriously damaged but that the U.S. has now become Europe’s enemy. Since coming to office, Trump has launched an active campaign against European democracy, with members of his administration not only bashing Europe but openly supporting far-right parties across the continent.

The common perception about Europe is that it is indecisive, too slow to act, even when major crises come knocking at its door. There is an element of truth in that, as the E.U. has shown a proclivity for reactive rather than proactive political behavior. But the Trump shock appears to be rousing Europe from its geopolitical slumber. The E.U. is standing up to the bully in Washington and is looking after Europe’s own interests with greater zeal than ever before. This is because there is indeed an emerging consensus among European policymakers and experts alike that Trump wants to do to Europe what he is doing to the U.S.--i.e., destroy its civil society. MAGA hates Europe for cultural and political reasons. For Trump, as Célia Belin, senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations and head of the Paris office, aptly put it, “Europeans are an extension of his political opposition at home... and Europe is thus a symbol of the political ideals [that] Trump seeks to eliminate, transform, and subjugate.”

In its attempts to find a new role in world affairs in the Trump era, Europe is not merely reacting to Washington’s whims but seeks to implement policies that reinforce its own strategic autonomy, both internally and externally. The European Commission has updated its industrial strategy by speeding up clean energy and pursuing new trade agreements with reliable partners. While some European leaders see both Russia and China as representing a threat to the rules-based international order, there have been numerous calls by various policymakers across the continent for a closer collaboration between China and the E.U. in light of “Trump’s ‘mafia-like’ tactics.” European Union leaders will travel for a high-stakes summit to Beijing in July after failing to convince Chinese President Xi Jinping to visit Brussels for a summit marking the 50th anniversary of E.U.-China diplomatic relations. And France has called for a stronger E.U.-China alignment on climate action amid the U.S.’ withdrawal from the Paris agreement.

China is the E.U.’s second-largest trading partner. Europe is, in fact, not only growing more dependent on China for manufactured goods but, in spite of differences in bilateral relations, such as China’s position on the war in Ukraine, is actually warming up to the idea that the E.U.-China relationship is an essential vehicle for tackling global challenges and safeguarding international multilateralism.

Europe is also looking into other regions of the world as part of a concerted effort to promote ever more vigorously its own strategic autonomy. Since Trump took office, the E.U. concluded a free trade agreement with Mercosur, an economic bloc made up of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Bolivia, with scores of other countries (among them are Chile, Columbia, Ecuador, and Peru) as associate members. Mercosur, or the Southern Common Market, is the fifth-largest economy and encompasses more than 285 million people.

The E.U.-Mercosur agreement, which had been in the making for 25 years, still needs to be ratified, and Argentina’s far-right Milei government, which is in close political-ideological alignment with the Trump administration, could prove to be a stumbling block to its ratification. Argentinian President Javier Milei is, in fact, more interested in signing a free trade agreement with the United States, which would be in violation of Mercosur regulations.

After many years of negotiations, the E.U. is also close to finalizing a free trade agreement with India. The 11th round of negotiations between India and the E.U. concluded on May 16, and there is a firm commitment by both sides to strike a deal by the end of 2025. As European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said, this agreement would be “the largest deal of its kind anywhere in the world.”

If ratified, the E.U.-Mercosur free trade agreement will create a market of around 800 million people. When finalized, the E.U.-India free trade agreement will create a market of close to 2 billion consumers.

Trump is trying to remake the United States in his own image and also to destroy the E.U., which he says is “nastier than China.” One would like to believe that it is probably unlikely that he will succeed in remaking the U.S. in his own nasty image, but it is positively certain that he will not succeed in destroying Europe and its institutions, even though there is a lot that needs to be done to create a fairer and more inclusive Europe. In the meantime, however, Trump’s “mafia-like tactics” are bringing Europeans closer together and the continent ever closer to other regions of the world.

### Leadership---Impact---AT: EU Fails---Populism---2NC

#### European populism is short-lived AND doesn’t preclude leadership if isolated.

Crum ’23 [Ben and Alvaro Oleart; March 2; Professor of Political Science at the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam; Postdoctoral Political Science Researcher, Université Libre de Bruxelles; London School of Economics, “Populist Parties and Democratic Resilience in Europe,” https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2023/03/02/populist-parties-and-democratic-resilience-in-europe/]

In practice, however, populist parties often remain strikingly ambivalent on the question of democracy. They present themselves as promoters of a new kind of politics that is meant to reinvigorate democracy. They often include factions that seek radical democracy as well as others that seek to strike whole social groups from the ballot. They can move from fundamental opposition to the pluralist constitution to its most fervent defender.

For sure, in the European context, the example of the right-wing populist Fidesz-led government in Hungary demonstrates how populism can lead to the termination of democracy (at least for now). However, in countries such as Italy, Austria, and Greece, populist parties that attained government have been successfully, and peacefully, ousted again. In the case of the Spanish Podemos, a populist party has even turned into one of the most loyal defenders of the constitutional democratic order.

Populist parties, democracy and pluralism

In a new edited volume, Populist Parties and Democratic Resilience, we approach populist parties’ democratic inclinations as a variable; a variable that may change over time and in response to changing conditions. This approach requires us, first of all, to be very precise about where the threat to democracy lies. Building on the work of Lise Herman, we identify democracy to be threatened when core pluralist institutions (like courts and a public media system) are challenged and when social groups are disqualified for political participation.

Our contributors offer in-depth analyses of populist parties in eleven European Union countries (Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, The Netherlands, Poland, Romania, and Spain). We track the evolution of the anti-pluralist inclinations in the populist parties over time and we try to identify how this evolution has been affected by institutional arrangements and strategic responses from other political parties.

For sure, our analyses do not yield one bulletproof mechanism that can socialise populist parties into democratic pluralism. Still, our findings suggest that populist parties are certainly not destined for electoral success and that institutions and the strategies of mainstream parties can affect the incentives that populist parties experience.

One interesting finding in Central and Eastern Europe is that corruption, rather than liberal-democratic values per se, has become a key issue in the political landscape which competitors of populist parties can use to contain them. The political salience of the issue of corruption puts potentially anti-pluralist populist parties on the defensive. Even if mainstream powers do not succeed in removing populists from power, as happened to ANO in the Czech Republic in 2021, it does create a check on them that ensures any nefarious moves they may want to make face a substantial and societally visible countermovement, as in Romania.

Democratic resilience

The main take-away message is that European democracies prove resilient to anti-pluralist populism in multiple, different ways. In western Europe, populist parties face serious trade-offs if they want to stick to a truly anti-pluralist strategy. A case in point is the AfD in Germany, which faces the choice of committing to the democratic process or being criminalised.

Populist parties in the Netherlands face a slightly different trade-off of either being incorporated among the establishment parties or facing severe competition by younger populist competitors. In turn, the Vlaams Belang faces a comparable dilemma in Belgium, as the cordon sanitaire imposed upon it by the other parties has benefitted it but also confirmed its marginal status and, ultimately, places a natural ceiling to the support it can attain.

Perhaps unsurprisingly, our findings suggest above all that populist parties are more likely to be successfully accommodated in political systems with strong pluralist institutions and a well-consolidated party system as background institutions. In contrast, for most targeted interventions, the impact is mixed and conditional.

Thus, legal persecution of extremist and racist positions may have a sanitary effect, as seems to have happened in Germany, but much of that hinges on the authority that these legal institutions enjoy. Similarly, high electoral thresholds may work to keep anti-pluralist parties out, but they may also help the build-up of societal frustration. Interestingly, in the case of the Netherlands we find that low electoral thresholds help to destabilise anti-pluralist parties and create an ongoing inflow of new competitors.

The same applies for strategies that mainstream parties can adopt vis-à-vis their populist contenders. Our sample includes cases in which anti-pluralist parties have been courted by the mainstream parties – both in programmatic terms as well as in actually making them a coalition partner in government – but also cases in which populist parties have been isolated by way of a cordon sanitaire.

While the cordon sanitaire strategy may be the more principled one, it has certainly not been unequivocally successful. In the Belgian case, it has actually served the Vlaams Belang quite well. In contrast, government participation may have helped to accommodate Podemos and the Five Star Movement, but in the cases of the FPÖ in Austria and the supporting role that the PVV played for the Dutch government in 2012, it rather seems to have fuelled the anti-pluralism of the populist parties in question. What stands out from this inventory of mechanisms is that the further anti-pluralist actors are normalised without having rejected their anti-pluralism inclinations, the more likely it is that they will be empowered in an undemocratic direction and contaminate the political system.

Populist parties are here to stay in Europe’s party systems. However, they do not signal the inevitable demise of democracy in Europe. In fact, populist parties often remain ambivalent about democracy, and in some cases can reinvigorate it. Rather than a blanket disqualification of their democratic credentials, their words and actions have to be closely monitored for anti-pluralist inclinations. Ultimately, Europe’s democratic systems can prove their resilience by carefully calibrating their institutional and behavioural responses to populist parties.

## PIC---Unions

## CP---OLRC

## K---Buddhism

### Theory---Conditionality---2NC

## Case

### Circumvention---2NC

#### Overwhelming reduction in enforcement.

Purifoy ’8-6 [Parker; August 6; Reporter; Bloomberg, “Federal Worker Unions Short on Options During Trump Policy Blitz,” https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor-report/federal-workers-union-contacts]

The FLRA has been without a Senate-confirmed general counsel since 2017, which cuts off another pathway for unions to get disputes before the full authority and compounds the issue if agencies refuse to engage in arbitration.

The FLRA’s Grundmann and MSPB’s Harris both sued to undo their firings. The Supreme Court and a D.C. federal appeals panel upheld injunction stays in Harris and Grundmann’s cases, respectively, meaning they likely won’t be reinstated until the merits of their firings are examined.

The White House proposed drastically shrinking the FLRA and consolidating decision-making responsibilities with the authority members starting next year.

The fiscal year 2026 budget proposed eliminating all administrative law judges and designating the authority’s staff attorneys as hearing officers to conduct fact-finding and draft recommended decisions in ULP cases. It will also remove decision-making responsibility from regional directors in representation cases, allowing those disputes to go straight up to the authority.

The budget proposal states the changes are designed to improve agency efficiency and cut costs, but Summerlin said it could inflict lasting damage.

### Circumvention---AT: Durable Fiat---2NC

#### 2. PREDICTABILITY---topically, AFFs get the right *to* bargain, not the outcome.

Roth ’22 [Andrew; February 17; Senior Counsel at Bredhoff and Kaiser, J.D., magna cum laude, from the University of Michigan School of Law, B.S. from Cornell University; United States District Court for the Eastern District of California, “Amalgamated Transit Union International et al. v. United States Department of Labor et al., Reporter’s Transcript of Proceedings RE: Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment,” No. 2:20-CV-00953]

THE COURT: Does your position equate collective bargaining with the substantive terms and conditions of employment so you can define rights as narrowly as you like?

MR. ROTH: Absolutely -- the -- the right is to bargain. Not the right -- there's no right to get it. There’s nothing under PERPA -- I mean, if the Court were to rule in our favor, all these transit agencies could say, you know, I’m glad you want to go back to where you were, but I’m not doing it. I mean, you know, we don’t have to, and they can -- they can bargain to impasse over that.

There’s no -- there's no dictation of substantive terms whatever in our position, and the D.C. Circuit said that in ATU v. Donovan. They said: You just can’t, by fiat, say all right, we’re not going to even talk to. We can’t talk to you. You can’t have -- you can’t even say -- I mean, if ATU wanted to, they couldn’t say we’ll take -- we'll take a wage cut. We really want those pensions. We want the security of these pensions. Now they can’t do that.

#### ‘Rights’ are defeasible and can be overridden.

Gomez ’24 [Cody; 2024; Awarded a Ph.D. in Philosophy for this dissertation, now a Post-Doctoral Fellow in the Department of Philosophy at Colorado College; Digital Repository at the University of Maryland, “The Defeasibility of Rights,” https://drum.lib.umd.edu/items/c08f289f-88e5-45d4-ba44-57b28307afc8]

The first paper, Hohfeldian Conceptions of Rights and Rights Proliferation, argues that competing theories allow for wild proliferation of rights by adopting some form of the “correlativity doctrine,” wherein myriad duties and permissions are equivalent to rights, e.g., an act of charity no longer seems charitable if the recipient has “a right” to aid. The second paper, Rights as Defaults remedies this by rejecting the correlativity doctrine in favor of my Rights-as Defaults Model. Using US free speech case law and work in default logic, I argue that fundamental rights are best understood as modifiable collections of defeasible generalizations. This model allows the right to free speech and its protections to accommodate new cases without building long lists of exceptions into the rights themselves while avoiding proliferation. Finally, the third paper, Revising the Right to do Wrong, applies this model to the question: do we have a moral right to do wrong? Do I have a moral right to offend a stranger even if I am required not to? I claim that there is no need for a standalone “right to do wrong” because understanding rights as defeasible means that any right can be overridden (or override competing considerations). I show how it is not paradoxical to say I have the right to offend you even though I, all-things-considered, should not, and even if we think interference would be justified.

#### ‘Strengthen’ precludes new enforcement---standard of review is legally distinct from remedies.

Tushnet ’8 [Mark; 2008; American legal scholar, Professor of Law at Harvard Law School; Weak Courts, Strong Rights: Judicial Review and Social Welfare Rights in Comparative Constitutional Law, “Enforcing Social and Economic Rights,” Ch. 8]

My description of weak and strong substantive rights regularly slides between identifying a standard of review, which goes to the strength of the right, and mentioning what courts do when they find violations of the weak or strong rights, which goes to the remedies available for violations. A critic of this presentation might say that the distinction between weak and strong substantive rights is simply one about the timing of the remedy, with strong rights receiving immediate judicial remedies, weak ones receiving deferred judicial remedies, and nonjusticiable rights not being rights at all. The critic might add that the constitutional provisions I have described use terms such as "within available resources" and "progressive realization" as part of the definition of the right, seemingly folding the remedy into the rights definition itself. Further, the critic might note that what makes a right strong is the fact that legislatures have a quite narrow range of choices available to them with respect to the right, and that in such circumstances, all enforcement must be strong in the sense that it forces policy outcomes into the narrow range the constitution permits. And, finally, the critic might suggest that, in a world of reasonable disagreement about what a constitution's provisions mean, no rights can be strong in the appropriate sense.

#### Especially because the plan is vague.

Naznin ’18 [Atia; December 1; Master of Human Rights and Democratisation from the University of Sydney, Master of Laws from the University of Dhaka, Bachelor of Laws from the University of Dhaka; Macquarie Law School, “Forced Slum Evictions in Bangladesh: The Role of Structural Injunction as an Appropriate Judicial Remedy,” Ch. 4]

To some extent, social rights are weak for being vague in content to clarify the extent of positive state obligations. Consequently, courts remain anxious about their proper adjudicative limit, or at the very least in adopting a strong remedial decision. As Ebadolahi puts it:

Just what suffices to constitute a “basic” education, “access” to housing or health care, or “sufficient” food or water? Without clear meaning, how can the judiciary evaluate whether or not the State is fulfilling its duties to “respect, protect, promote and fulfil” these rights? How can vague rights be meaningfully adjudicated or enforced and violations remedied? 122

Whenever vagueness persists, it becomes difficult to identify the enforceable content of the right at stake. Courts may attempt to overcome this challenge by applying a ‘minimum core’ standard as developed in international human rights law to identify the core state obligations for realising a right (see Chapter 2 for a detailed analysis). Subsistence and enforcement of a minimum essential level of socio-economic rights ‘is necessary to enable individuals to act in ways guaranteed by other rights and to enable them to actively as well as effectively participate in the democratic process’. 123

Alongside the constitutional legitimacy challenge to judicial intervention, courts often reject applying a minimum core approach due to concerns about institutional competency.124 In coming to remedial decisions, instead of considering the infringement of the minimum core obligation, they prefer a deferential ‘reasonableness’ standard that only determines the adequacy of government measures. For instance, the SACC in its often-cited Grootboom decision observed that:

‘[i]n this case, we do not have sufficient information to determine what would comprise the minimum core obligation in the context of our Constitution. It is not even necessary to decide whether it is appropriate for a Court to determine in the first instance the minimum core content of a right.125

Thus, practical considerations as to the court’s institutional incapacity also determine the judges’ approach and ultimately impact the constitutional as well as the judicial protection to a particular right while informing its substance and nature.

#### Even ‘strengthened’ CBRs are circumvented.

Staihar ’17 [Jim; 2017; Assistant Professor at the Robert H. Smith School of Business, University of Maryland; Associate Director of the Center for the Study of Business Ethics, Regulation, and Crime at the University of Maryland; University of Pennsylvania Journal of Business Law, “Income Inequality and Pay Ratio Disclosure: A Moral Critique of Section 953(b),” vol. 19]

[\*494] And even if workers have sufficiently strong collective bargaining rights, there can still be impediments to exercising those rights. Various forms of corruption can prevent workers from effectively exercising collective bargaining rights. Companies might coerce workers not to unionize. At one extreme, companies can use violence to break up any attempt among employees to form a union. 144 Union leaders can also fall prey to corruption, violating their fiduciary duty to bargain effectively on behalf of workers in the pay-setting process. At another extreme, union leaders might accept bribes from companies they are negotiating with in exchange for accepting lower wages or benefits for union workers. 145

#### ‘Should’ connotes ‘could’---debating possible mechanisms is most real world AND predictable.

Lambertson ’42 [F.W.; 1942; Professor of Speech at Iowa State Teachers College; Quarterly Journal of Speech, “The meaning of the word ‘should’ in a question of policy,” vol. 28]

Now let us turn to the second question of the questionnaire. It reads, "Does the idea 'should adopt' involve the idea 'could adopt'? " Personally I believe it does. The word "could" connotes that the remedy is "within the realm of possibility." No planning · committee is going to be so foolish as to suggest a problem where no remedy is possible. The committee was entirely right in telling the debater to ignore the "could" point of view.

In answer to this question on the questionnaire twenty-two of the forty returned were checked "yes" (mostly without comment), nine were checked "no;" and nine were not marked. Some of the comments read as follows:

"What is the sense of discussing the 'should' of a principle if it is not ... attainable?" Lew Sarett, Northwestern University.

"In my judgment 'should' involves 'could' in the sense that the necessary mechanisms for putting the plan into operation are available." A. T. Weaver, University of Wisconsin.

“There is no sense in debating a proposal which it is agreed cannot be done; that is merely wishful thinking. Why debate that the British fleet should bomb Berlin?" Brooks Quimby, Bates College.

"If it could not be adopted, it would imply that the proposition is not practicable." I. M. Cochran, Carleton College.

#### 3. EDUCATION---circumvention is central and requires research.

Ronconi ’19 [Lucas; March 2019; Researcher at the Centro de Investigación y Acción Social in Argentina, and Research Fellow at the Institute of Labor Economics in Germany; IZA World of Labor, “Enforcement of labor regulations in developing countries,” vol. 457]

More public enforcement can help reduce violations of labor regulations. Domestic and external factors have been identified in the literature as determinants of public enforcement; but, mainly because of lack of data, there is only partial understanding of the political economy of enforcement in the developing world. Furthermore, the potential simultaneous relationships between de jure labor regulations, enforcement, and economic outcomes is debated with strong opposing opinions and little empirical support. Policymakers have to understand local institutional particularities if they aim to design feasible welfare enhancing policies.

MOTIVATION

Across the less developed world, governments have enacted employment, social security, and occupational health and safety regulations. Those regulations are usually de jure universal, with some notable exceptions such as firm size-based legislation in South Asia. In practice, however, estimates suggest that more than half of private sector employees in the developing world do not receive legally mandated labor benefits due to employer non-compliance. Enforcing labor regulations, however, can be controversial. On the one extreme, non-compliance is viewed as a way to achieve de facto flexibility and economic efficiency in countries where political distortions explain the existence of overly stringent labor laws. On the other extreme, non-compliance is viewed as capitalist abuse of workers and as an impediment to the effective implementation of policies that solve labor market failures.

This article focuses on two key concerns for policymakers in developing countries: first, should governments devote more resources and/or increase fines to enforce existing labor regulations? Are the social benefits of compliance higher than the potential costs of the destruction of informal jobs? Second, which domestic and external factors influence public enforcement? Who are the main actors and institutions, and how do they shape effective labor regulation?

Despite some recent efforts and some interesting findings, the academic literature can only provide partial answers to these broad questions. This is in part due to lack of knowledge about the institutions responsible for enforcing labor regulations; and in part due to the complex relationship between de jure regulations, enforcement, and economic outcomes.

DISCUSSION OF PROS AND CONS

Theoretically, quite a lot is known about enforcement of labor regulations. It is clear that the behavior of employers and workers not only depends on the letter of the labor code, but also on its effective implementation. Effective labor regulation (i.e. the combination of de jure regulations and enforcement) can have positive or negative effects on economic outcomes depending on the existence of market failures (e.g. firms with the power to set wages, or incomplete and asymmetric information about occupational hazards). Furthermore, even when market failures are pervasive, government intervention can either improve efficiency or make things worse. That is to say, a reasonably informed policy recommendation cannot be based exclusively on theoretical grounds; it requires country-specific empirical work.

Providing sound empirical evidence, however, is quite challenging. First, it requires quantitative data and institutional knowledge on economic outcomes, labor codes, and government enforcement. Second, to compute a causal effect, the methodology needs to take into account the complex relationship among these three variables. There are reasons to suspect a simultaneous relationship, as shown in Figure 1. For example, not only do employers and workers react to effective regulation, but also legislators introduce reforms to the labor code based on the performance of the labor market and the enforcement system. Furthermore, the institutions in charge of enforcing labor regulations (i.e. labor courts and inspection agencies) might determine their efforts based on the letter of the law, and the performance of the labor market. Finally, effects are likely to differ across labor markets due to variation in institutions and economic structure, making cross-country analysis problematic.

A clear example of the difficulties involved in providing solid empirical evidence can be found in a seminal 2004 study [2]. This influential paper made an important contribution by computing comparable measures of labor regulations across countries; it concluded that more stringent labor regulations have negative economic consequences such as higher unemployment, especially of the young. The evidence, however, suffers an important methodological weakness. Due to lack of enforcement data, the authors only use de jure measures of regulation, which biases the estimates when enforcement and laws are correlated. As shown in Figure 2, there is in fact a negative correlation: countries with more stringent labor laws tend to enforce less. Furthermore, a recent replication study finds that the negative correlation between labor regulation and economic outcomes found in the above work disappears when proxies of enforcement are included in the analysis [1].

Therefore, more research is necessary to make reasonably informed policy recommendations, particularly on the set of institutions in charge of enforcing labor regulations (courts, inspection agencies, and labor unions), and on the complex relationship between economic outcomes and effective labor regulation. The available evidence, however, already provides some useful partial answers.

#### Their model brushes aside necessary questions strengthening labor policy.

Kochan ’98 [Thomas; Spring 1998; Co-Director, Institute for Work and Employment Research, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; University of Pennsylvania Journal of Labor and Employment Law, “Labor Policy for the Twenty-First Century,” vol. 1]

A primary objective of national policy should then be to promote the development and broader diffusion among employees and employers and their organizations of the capabilities needed to internalize responsibility for enforcing employment law and for adapting regulations to fit their particular circumstances. Those employers and employees with effective self-governance systems should be granted greater flexibility in how they meet the goals and standards contained in various employment regulations.

C. Supporting Experimentation and Learning

These new principles require considerable institutional innovation, especially if they are to address the needs of those workers who are not employed full-time for an extended period by a single employer at a fixed work site. Unions and/or other associations need to develop the strategies and capabilities to represent workers as they want to be represented. Government enforcement agencies, neutrals, the courts, and the parties to employment disputes all need to develop fair procedures for resolving disputes privately. Employers need to create workplace environments and policies that win and sustain the trust and support of employees and add economic value to the enterprise. These efforts will require a process of experimentation and learning. Fostering this experimental learning process should be an explicit goal and high priority of labor policy makers and administrators.

III. IMPLEMENTING THE PRINCIPLES: A TWO-TRACK PROPOSAL

Principles are fine; however, as with any policy, the action (or the devil) is in the details. Therefore, I want to outline here a set of specific legislative and administrative actions that would put these principles to work and begin the testing and learning process. The basic proposal is to create a flexible self-governance option for adapting and internalizing enforcement of workplace laws and regulations that would be available for those employers and employees that have instituted state-of-the-art employee participation practices and dispute resolution systems. This self-governance option would be built on the foundation of other necessary reforms to labor and employment law that would apply to all employment relationships. However, participants of the self-governance option would be encouraged to meet some of their legal requirements through practices adapted to fit their particular circumstances that produce equivalent or better results.

#### 4. LOGIC---enforcement is a consequence, not a mandate.

Ronconi ’15 [Lucas and Ravi Kanbur; December 3; Researcher at the Centro de Investigación y Acción Social (CIAS) and CONICET; Professor of Economics at Cornell University; Charles H. Dyson School of Applied Economics and Management, Cornell University, “Enforcement Matters: The Effective Regulation of Labor,” WP 2016-03]

The causes and consequences of labor regulation have received substantial attention from economists and social scientists. Theory stresses that the relevant concept to study is effective labor regulation, that is, the combination of both de jure regulations and state enforcement efforts. Country specific studies confirm the importance of non-compliance with labor regulations, especially in developing countries.1 And yet cross-country studies invariably use de jure measures of labor regulation stringency. This is true, in particular, of the highly influential study by Botero et. al. (2004) whose findings have been used to argue for the negative consequences of labor regulation.2 At the same time, the study by La Porta et. al. (2008) proposes and confirms “the legal origin theory” as an explanation for cross-country variations of labor regulation, once again using de jure measures of labor regulation stringency.

The cross-country econometric studies which use de jure measures of labor regulation recognize the importance of enforcement, but in effect say that they are forced to use the de jure measures because they do not have measures of enforcement. But how can we credibly assess the consequences of labor regulation if we only consider the letter of the law, ignoring the possibility that enforcement is lower in those places where the law is more stringent? These are not purely hypothetical questions. Noncompliance with labor regulations is pervasive around the world. Furthermore, noncompliance is particularly high in developing countries, and at the same time, those countries tend to have the most stringent regulations. Is it correct to assume that state intervention in the labor market is more stringent in Venezuela or Angola, where labor laws are quite protective but enforcement and compliance are very low, than in Canada or New Zealand, where the opposite occurs? The existing cross-country empirical research, however, usually makes such an unrealistic assumption because of lack of data on enforcement.

### Foreign Service---2NC

#### No foreign service internal:

#### That restores accountability and create a more agile and informed Department.

Winton ’25 [Scott B.; September 23; MS foreign service, foreign service officer with nearly two decades of experience, Senior Labor Advisor at the Department of State; American Mind, "A State Department for the Golden Age," https://americanmind.org/salvo/a-state-department-for-the-golden-age/]

The U.S. Department of State is too bureaucratic, insular, and disconnected from the American people to meet today’s global challenges. For those reasons, Secretary Rubio announced a reduction in force and a broader reorganization of the department in July. These reforms should inspire hope in those wishing to enter a career in diplomacy and international relations. Above all, they need to be worthy of the American people’s trust and confidence. One hopes this is just the beginning of reforms that will create a State Department that is prepared for conflict around the world, agile in crisis, deliberate in strategy, and effective in delivering results for the American people.

Secretary Rubio’s reforms reflect the spirit of Harry S. Truman, namesake of the State Department’s headquarters. The last U.S. president without a college degree, Truman was born in the rural Missouri Ozarks in the small town of Lamar and raised outside Kansas City, Missouri. From humble beginnings, he learned the value of grit, service, and earning one’s keep—a reflection of Midwestern values.

Truman is remembered for the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, the creation of NATO, recognizing Israel, and helping to found the United Nations—policies and actions that helped shape the Cold War order that is now giving way to a new era. Like many from his background, he harbored a deep dislike for Washington, D.C., often feeling unwelcome despite years of service, professional success, and lasting friendships. I maintain a similar love-hate relationship with our nation’s capital.

The irony is unmistakable: the State Department’s headquarters bears the name of a man whose kind it has long resisted serving, defending, or hiring. Today, however, we face a rare moment—driven by global urgency—that offers an opportunity to finally change this paradigm.

That is why Secretary Rubio’s reforms must be expanded across the entire department. By embracing Professionalism, Excellence, Accountability, Community, and Empowerment (PEACE) and elevating the builders within State, internal resistance can be overcome, credibility can be restored, and America’s ability to lead in an era of global conflict can be strengthened.

Status Quo by Design

For decades the State Department has been experiencing bureaucratic resistance, which takes many forms. As outlined by organizations like DemocracyAID, tactics include quiet quitting, withholding or limiting information sharing, excluding certain personnel from key meetings, stonewalling paper clearances, and conflict avoidance, including brushing off individuals who are perceived to be unaligned with specific political imperatives. These are not simply ideological acts of opposition—though politics plays a role—but are symptoms of a much deeper problem: decades of poor management, a lack of accountability, and a culture that prioritizes equal outcomes over equal opportunity and merit-based advancement.

Long before the Biden-Harris Administration’s short-sighted, politicized approach to Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion, the department had already grown insular, disconnected, and unrepresentative of the citizens it serves. Persistent derogatory attitudes toward Republicans, working-class Americans, people of faith (including Christians), rural communities, and those without a college degree have harmed employees from these backgrounds and eroded State’s ability to represent the broader American public and our national interests. This includes Main Street’s interests—not just those of Hollywood, Wall Street, Silicon Valley, and the Ivory Tower. Many colleagues, peers, and even mentors from these groups came to believe this hostility was meant to drive them out. They were likely right.

This culture has taken a heavy toll on morale and execution. Even under the previous administration, senior Biden officials quietly questioned whether the State Department was truly capable of conducting modern diplomacy. It was not uncommon for colleagues at the White House to ask without irony, “Does State do diplomacy?” The department was viewed as bloated, unresponsive, and incapable of fulfilling its core constitutional responsibilities. While officials may deny this publicly—federal employees remain a core political constituency—many would privately acknowledge deep dysfunction and a need for reform.

The challenge now is whether political leadership on both sides of the aisle is willing to act. Secretary Rubio has signaled his intent to make the difficult decisions necessary to modernize the department. That task will be far more effective—and more lasting—if it is met with bipartisan support. Fixing the State Department should not be a partisan issue. It is a national security imperative.

One place to start is returning to Missouri-inspired values like the ones President Truman brought to the White House. The State Department should look to model their reforms on the College of the Ozarks, a federally recognized work college that grounds its mission in five core areas: academics, religion, culture, vocation, and patriotic growth. These values reflect the beliefs of a broad swath of Americans—many of whom have too often been dismissed or ignored by the national security establishment. They have served the Ozarks well and could serve the nation well in a time of need.

PEACE

Ensuring that State effectively and objectively serves the American people while moving at the “speed of relevance” requires creating a new code and new core values. This is our moment to forge a department guided by the character of the American statesman and stateswoman.

Professionalism: U.S. diplomats should be patriots who conduct themselves with competence and respect while faithfully advancing U.S. national interests and exemplifying the highest standards of public service at home and abroad. State Department leaders must model integrity, discipline, and openness to differing viewpoints; evaluate and communicate their teams’ perspectives objectively and without bias; and foster a culture of candor. By encouraging constructive conflict and providing space for grievances to be aired, leaders create an environment where people feel heard—one that ultimately strengthens the team’s effectiveness and finds the best solutions.

Excellence: The builders and doers who are delivering every day (and not just on non-mental health days) for the secretary and the president should be the model for all personnel. I firmly believe these individuals represent the majority of my colleagues serving at home and abroad. These are the innovators and patriots, and they deserve internal and public recognition. Restarting the internal awards process while partnering with the Ben Franklin Fellowship to launch privately funded recognitions, as the State Department has done for other groups, would be a powerful way to reignite excellence.

Accountability: Leadership at the top—especially from the 7th floor—needs to direct senior career officials to hold underperformers accountable. This may require overcoming reluctance from officials who are waiting for future career opportunities or avoiding their core responsibilities. Meanwhile, reform-minded employees—the silent majority—remain under scrutiny, and there is little accountability for those who leak, underperform, or resist implementing the policies of the president. The 7th floor must not only authorize reform but also drive it forward with urgency.

Community: It is time to rebuild a culture that’s anchored in the renewed core values that can sustain the department’s authority as the premier foreign affairs agency, one that’s worthy of the trust and confidence of our diplomats and their families serving abroad. Equally important is restoring the State Department’s credibility by confronting its insular, ineffective, and often disconnected approach to domestic concerns and the interests of the citizens we serve.

One way to develop our community is a limited relaunch of employee organizations aligned with administration priorities. When managed well, these groups boost morale, encourage dialogue with leadership, and showcase the department’s commitment to all Americans, including working-class families, Christians, and veterans. My experience founding FirstGens@State in 2022—which has grown to 700 members and has advanced recruitment, mentorship, and retention—proves the value of such employee organizations. Unlike identity-based models, FirstGens@State members bring unique American experiences, grit, and patriotism that better inform discussions around U.S. national interests and strengthen the understanding of the global majority.

Empowerment: Great leadership means giving your team the freedom to act without offloading responsibilities. Therefore, power should be delegated to subordinates to make decisions, and they—as well as leadership—should be held accountable for outcomes. The 7th floor should actively promote a culture that rewards courage, leadership, hard work, teamwork, innovation, and calculated risk-taking. That includes expanding access to professional development, senior responsibilities, and face time with department and White House leadership. The 7th floor must become comfortable providing the authority to act, but never shed the responsibility for the mission’s success or failure—otherwise, the status quo will return.

The Way Forward

External stakeholders play a significant role, should they choose diplomacy and collaboration around shared interests. Together, the American Foreign Service Association, the American Academy of Diplomacy, the Ben Franklin Fellowship, and other similar organizations can speak with a unified voice to drive change at the department. But division prevents these ideas from reaching fruition.

So far, public statements from some of these groups’ members have reflected vitriol and incivility. Academy member and former AFSA President Eric Rubin said the following about BFF on Trailing House’s Facebook community page: “Foreign Service friends and colleagues: know thy enemy. ‘All enemies, foreign and domestic.’” (This post appears to have been taken down since it was posted earlier this year.)

How can U.S. Foreign Service members take your organization seriously if you do not set a tone for constructive dialogue and demonstrate a willingness to engage in good faith? The silent majority within the department needs establishment senior diplomats and civil servants to step up and perform far better. It’s time to grow up.

In our present environment, high-performing State Department professionals—and ultimately the American people—bear the heaviest burden. They compensate for obstructionists while navigating subtle relational aggression and peer surveillance. This includes staff who increasingly face reputational attacks, doxing, and tactics that are more typical of civil conflict than a workplace. The world isn’t waiting for the State Department to get its act together. Foreign adversaries are watching—and exploiting—our division. Reform cannot be parked on the runway. We have to fly the plane, fix it midair, and be ready for the long-haul journey ahead.

#### Political appointments thump.

Walt ’25 [Stephen M.; September 10; PhD, professor of international relations at Harvard University; Foreign Policy, “The Top 10 Trump Administration Foreign-Policy Mistakes,” https://archive.ph/daS0X]

9. Institutionalizing incompetence. These foreign-policy blunders aren’t surprising, because the administration has made a point of appointing officials who are not qualified for the positions they hold, have little or no experience running large organizations, and were chosen not for their professional knowledge but for their personal their loyalty to the president.

I’m talking about you, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth; and you, Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard; and especially you, special envoy Steve Witkoff. For crying out loud: Who would give a real estate mogul with zero diplomatic experience the difficult task of resolving the war in Ukraine and ending the genocide in Gaza? Answer: a president who didn’t really care about achieving either one. These are the kind of unserious people who think that calling a body of water the “Gulf of America” or trying to rename the Defense Department will magically make the United States safer, stronger, and more prosperous.

I know what you’re thinking. Given some of my other writings, you might think I’d be in favor of taking a machete to the foreign-policy blob, and that I would therefore applaud Trump’s efforts to purge the State Department, fire a lot of senior military officers and top intelligence officials, and pressure plenty of other civil servants to resign.

But as I’ve noted before, the main problems with recent U.S. foreign policy have arisen not from the nonpartisan professionals in the civil or foreign service, but either from the flawed ambitions of every post-Cold War president or the political appointees whom they relied upon to advise them and implement their vision.

### Foreign Policy---2NC

#### Transnationalism and relationships prevail.

Frantzman ’10-10 [Seth; October 10; PhD, Adjunct Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies; Foundation for Defense of Democracies, “Why Donald Trump’s Diplomacy Appears to be Working,” https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2025/10/10/why-donald-trumps-diplomacy-appears-to-be-working/]

President Trump’s signature transactionalism and emphasis on personal relationships with foreign leaders are helping not hindering US foreign policy.

President Donald Trump’s push for a peace deal in Gaza appeared to pay off in the late hours of October 8 as Israel and Hamas indicated they had agreed to the first phase of a deal. Trump has been pushing for peace in Gaza since a ceasefire deal was secured before he took office in January. However, the push for peace has still taken time. There may be lessons to be learned from what appeared to work in late September and early October.

The White House has focused throughout 2025 on ending the war in Gaza and bringing home the hostages that Hamas holds in Gaza. Towards that end, it played a key role in a ceasefire from January through March. When the ceasefire broke down, US envoy Steve Witkoff attempted to revive it, and the Trump administration secured the release of the last living American hostage in Gaza, Edan Alexander, in May.

In July, Trump again pushed for peace and continued to try to revive efforts for a Gaza deal in late August and then in September. What has brought success in October is the ability to bring together Qatar, Turkey, Egypt, Israel, and the United States in Egypt for discussions with Hamas. There may be a lesson in this for the Trump administration’s search for a global doctrine. It brings together US partners and allies with Trump’s personal approach.

During his first term in office and the first ten months of his second term, Trump developed a distinctive approach to foreign policy. This doctrine is not always clearly articulated, but it has several unique elements. One of the main themes is a desire to end conflicts abroad and avoid entangling the US in further conflicts.

A second theme is a transactional approach to foreign ties, which typically, if commonsensically, means assessing whether foreign countries are fulfilling their obligations. What that has meant in the past is pressuring NATO to increase spending, or ensuring that countries in the Middle East continue to spend heavily on US defense platforms and aircraft.

The process that led to the Gaza deal was emblematic of both themes in Trump’s approach. First, he sought to bring together several Middle East countries to promote peace. This included talks with Arab and Muslim states, including close US allies and partners such as Qatar, Turkey, and Egypt. Turkey is seeking numerous deals in the US that could total billions in potential purchases from Boeing and Lockheed Martin, according to reports from September.

The Turkey aircraft deals follow purchases by Qatar announced in May. The White House said in May, during a visit by Trump to Qatar, that “today in Qatar, President Donald Trump signed an agreement with Qatar to generate an economic exchange worth at least $1.2 trillion. President Trump also announced economic deals totaling more than $243.5 billion between the United States and Qatar, including a historic sale of Boeing aircraft and GE Aerospace engines to Qatar Airways.”

These trade ties also provide an incentive for long-term peace in the region. Turkey has already seen how this can become a roller coaster. After Ankara acquired S-400s from Russia in 2019, it was given the cold shoulder in the F-35 program. Now Ankara wants to be back on better terms with Washington. Turkey’s president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, has enjoyed warm ties with Trump over the years.

A key feature of Trump’s foreign policy doctrine is to approach US foreign ties through the prism of personal relationships with leaders abroad. In the lead-up to the Gaza peace deal proposal, which was announced on September 29, Trump met with Arab and Muslim leaders on the sidelines of the UNGA. This face-to-face meeting appears to have paved the way for the deal that took place in Egypt on October 8.

Several key tactics helped push the deal forward. Trump frequently announced progress before the two sides had fully agreed. He was also willing to appear to pressure Israel, demanding an end to bombing in Gaza, for instance. This appearance of being willing to pressure everyone involved has succeeded because the pressure is combined with win-win promises for all the countries.

The president thanked Turkey, Qatar, and Egypt on October 8 as the deal was concluded. Israel also feels it has secured most of what it wanted in Gaza. Trump has appealed directly to Israelis and spoken with freed hostages and families of hostages to show he is in tune with what the Israeli public wants.

There is a sense that the White House believes this deal can reset strategy in the Middle East. One part of this policy portrays Trump as helping Israel get out of a conflict that was increasingly unpopular around the world.

“Israel cannot fight the world,” Trump said in a phone call with Netanyahu. He also believes that this deal will pave the way for future progress on peace in the region, much like the Abraham Accords, which were secured during the first term between Israel, the UAE, and Bahrain. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio has also praised this “historic moment.”

The question now is whether a successful doctrine will emerge from these first steps in ending the Gaza war. First, all parties must uphold the ceasefire. There is also a question as to whether the peace plan moves to its second phase. Last January’s ceasefire never reached the next stage of its planned sequence.

If the deal can be finalized, then the White House might try to apply this model for success to Ukraine and other conflicts. In any case, the United States has long sought to focus on Asia and near-peer rivalries with countries such as Russia and China.

Beijing and Moscow aim to establish a new world order, one that challenges the US-led order that emerged after the Cold War. They have been working to achieve this goal diplomatically, militarily, and economically. That means that after success in the Middle East, Washington will find its credibility increasing in other areas. Trump has claimed to have helped end seven conflicts in his first year in office. The Gaza deal will be the largest test yet for his doctrine.

### Great-Power War---2NC

#### No Chinese aggression.

Heath ’25 [Timothy R.; March 12; PhD Political Science, senior international defense researcher at RAND; RAND, “Book Review: 'Confronting China,' Edited by James H. Anderson and Daniel R. Green,” https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2025/03/book-review-confronting-china-by-james-h-anderson-and.html]

To what end is China modernizing its forces? Although the book's authors, following conventional wisdom, assume Beijing's motivations are aggressive, they overlook other potential economic and political reasons. Chinese leaders generously fund the military in part to cultivate its support, provide patronage, bolster patriotic support, and encourage military contributions to economic development. These economic and political factors explain, in part, the persistent problems of corruption and poor combat readiness that plague the PLA.

Even if we assume that the buildup is driven purely by aggressive impulses, and even if we assume that the buildup eventually results in a highly competent, lethal military, it's not clear how a powerful PLA could help Beijing achieve its goals. The authors repeatedly assert that China's military buildup is somehow tied to its presumed goal of “global dominance” (p. 103). Yet China's military is widely regarded as a regional military at .best with a limited ability to project power abroad. China has no military allies except maybe North Korea and only one overseas military base (in Djibouti), while the United States has dozens of allies and as many as 750 military bases in 80 countries.

Despite the disparity in global military presence, perhaps China could use its military to challenge America's primacy in a war of power transition. Andersen's introductory chapter hints at this possibility, stating that “most great power rivalries ultimately end in bloodshed.” Similarly, Green's chapter cites books with titles such as The Coming Conflict with China to suggest such a war may loom ahead (p. 25). However, power transition war tends to occur when a rising power threatens to surpass a status quo power. China's downward trajectory and continued U.S. economic success has made such a transition increasingly unlikely. In 2021, China's economy reached 76 percent of the size of the U.S. economy, but three years later, stagnation left China's economy at two-thirds the size of a thriving U.S. economy.

As prospects for power transition war have receded, some have instead proposed a war motivated by a declining China's fears about the future. But these predictions have not borne out, as Chinese leaders have shown little interest in belligerence amid a consuming focus on domestic woes. The most popular argument is that China might start a war with Taiwan that escalates into a broader war with the United States, a view advanced by several authors in the book. However, this does not solve the problem of how a powerful PLA helps China achieve its goal of international primacy. A Chinese victory over Taiwan does not guarantee U.S. capitulation any more than Japan's victory over the United States at Pearl Harbor did. Moreover, war between China and the United States, regardless of how or where it began, carries an enormous risk of escalation to nuclear annihilation, which would render questions of “international primacy” meaningless. Even if the United States decided not to directly intervene in a China-Taiwan war, it is unclear if this would truly end U.S. international leadership. After all, America's refusal to involve itself directly in combat operations when Russia invaded Ukraine did not fatally undermine U.S. international leadership.

#### No Russia.

Beebe ’24 [George Beebe, Mark Episkopos, and Anatol Lieven; July 8; MA, director of grand strategy at the Quincy Institute; PhD, Eurasia Research Fellow at the Quincy Institute; PhD, director of the Eurasia Program at the Quincy Institute; "Right-Sizing the Russian Threat to Europe," Quincy Institute, https://quincyinst.org/research/right-sizing-the-russian-threat-to-europe/#]

Western leaders, including U.S. President Joe Biden, have frequently framed the invasion of Ukraine as the first step in a Russian plan of broader European conquest. However, a close examination of Russian intent and military capabilities shows this view is dangerously mistaken. Russia likely has neither the capability nor the intent to launch a war of aggression against NATO members — but the ongoing brinkmanship between Russia and the West still poses serious risks of military escalation that can only be defused by supplementing military deterrence with a diplomatic effort to address tensions.

An analysis of Russian security thinking demonstrates that Putin’s stated views align with long-standing Russian fears about Western encroachment, given Russia’s lack of natural barriers to invasion. As Putin has come to view NATO as increasingly hostile to Russia, aggressive Russian action in defense of its claimed “sphere of influence” has become a factor in European security. However, contrary to many Western analyses, this does not mean that Russia views future wars of aggression against NATO member states as in its security interest.

This does not imply naivete about the danger of Russian aggression, as reflected most recently in its illegal invasion of Ukraine. But it highlights the fundamental differences between Russia’s perceptions of Ukraine, which it has long regarded as both critical to its national security and integral to its history and culture, and its views of NATO countries, where the cost-benefit balance of aggression for Russia would be very different.

Understanding Russian incentives also requires assessing Russia’s actual military capabilities compared to NATO. As frequently reiterated by NATO leadership, such an assessment shows that Russia is at a decisive conventional military disadvantage against the NATO alliance.

While Russia would do damage in a conventional war with NATO, it would almost certainly suffer a devastating defeat in such a conflict absent nuclear escalation. NATO has a greater than three-to-one advantage over Russia in active-duty ground forces. NATO also has even greater advantages in the air and at sea. The alliance has a ten-to-one lead in military aircraft and a large qualitative edge as well, raising the probability of total air superiority. At sea, NATO would likely have the capacity to impose a naval blockade on Russian shipping, whose costs would dwarf current economic sanctions. While Russia has clear military superiority over individual NATO states, especially in the Baltics, it is extremely unlikely it could exercise this advantage without triggering a broader war with the entire NATO alliance.

#### No MidEast.

Ellenbogen ’24 [Lucy Kurtzer; August 29; Director, Israel, The Palestinian Territories, and the Region Program at the USIP; United States Institute of Peace, “Israel-Hezbollah Contained Escalation Halts Concern Over Broader Mideast War,” https://www.usip.org/publications/2024/08/israel-hezbollah-contained-escalation-halts-concern-over-broader-mideast-war]

Both sides seem keen not to rule out further engagement, with Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu noting that the Israeli strike was not “the end of the story,” and Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah saying that they will assess the impact of their attack and reserve the right to “respond another time” if they deem necessary. However, both leaders simultaneously signaled intent and expectation of a pause, with Nasrallah saying in an August 26 speech, that Lebanon can “breathe a sigh of relief,” and Israel reopening its airport after a brief closure within hours of the military exchange.

So far, this latest incident underscores a prevailing sense that neither side sees large-scale conflagration in its interest. What remains is a delicate, if dangerous, dance of establishing deterrence, saving face and answering to domestic constituencies, both in Israel and in Lebanon. In Israel, 60,000 Israeli citizens remain displaced from the north, schools won’t reopen in the fall due to the Hezbollah threat, and there is a desire among the public to address the danger posed by Hezbollah, even amid ambivalence as to whether the most effective way to neutralize the threat is via war as opposed to ongoing U.S.-led diplomacy.

Meanwhile, in an already beleaguered Lebanon, where upward of 90,000 Lebanese have been displaced from the southern part of the country, there is scant appetite to be dragged into war by Hezbollah. To this end, both sides are claiming they have established deterrence, and Nasrallah appears to be signaling a desire for rules of relatively restrained and retaliation-only engagement by taking pains in his speech to note the military and non-civilian nature of the targets as parallel revenge for the narrow targeting of Shukr.

#### Miscalculation is a myth.

Schake ’23 [Kori; July 2023; PhD, senior fellow and the director of foreign and defense policy studies at the American Enterprise Institute; Johns Hopkins SAIS, “The Exculpating Myth of Accidental War,” https://sais.jhu.edu/kissinger/programs-and-projects/kissinger-center-papers/exculpating-myth-accidental-war]

The risk of war by miscalculation is a popular scholarly subject and a frequent concern of policymakers. Theories of war by miscalculation assume either ignorance by decisionmakers, bad faith by policy participants (usually the military), or a mechanistic series of exchanges that obviate the need for policymakers to display judgment and responsibility. Yet historians struggle to produce evidence that political leaders were either ignorant of the risks they were choosing or emasculated from any ability to affect the course of events. Theories of accidental war are, as Geoffrey Blainey has said, “a description masquerading as an explanation.”[1] Instead of explaining historical events, the myth of accidental war provides an intricate puzzle for intellectuals, a justification for moralists to fear military subversion of political decisionmakers, and an evasion of culpability for those decisionmakers.

The debate is not esoteric—it has urgent policy applications. U.S. policy regarding Russia’s February 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine has been heavily influenced by U.S. President Joe Biden and his administration’s concerns about “a third world war.”[2] Russia violated the sovereignty and the internationally recognized territory of Ukraine, despite its commitment to respect Ukraine’s security in the 1995 Budapest Memorandum. Failing to achieve its political objectives on the battlefield, Russian strategy shifted to targeting civilian dwellings, destroying infrastructure, and committing mass atrocities. All of these actions violate Russia’s international commitments and overtly challenge the Biden administration’s leadership of the rules-based international order, as well as its pledge to “stand against human rights abuses wherever they occur.”[3]

Although rational calculations of power ought to dictate Russian aversion to expanding the war from a trajectory of losing to Ukraine to one of more rapidly and decisively losing should the United States become a direct combatant, the Biden team’s policy is predicated on concerns that uncontrollable escalation could result from U.S. assistance to Ukraine. To avoid an accidental war with Russia, the Biden administration has defended the international order by timidly progressing from declining before and in the early stages of the invasion to provide weapons to Ukraine because they would quickly end up in Russian hands if Russia won as expected, to refusing to provide “offensive weapons,” to providing “offensive weapons” but not those that could reach Russian territory, to providing weapons that could reach Russian territory but making Ukraine promise not to use them at those ranges, to allowing Ukraine to target Russian forces in Crimea, to providing tanks and training in the United States.[4] Out of concern the United States could unavoidably be drawn into direct combat against Russia, the strongest power in the international order is conveying the limits of its interest to a violent transgressor losing a war against a lesser power.

The idea of accidental war also influences U.S. policy toward China, the “pacing challenge” in its great power rivalry, according to the Biden administration’s October 2022 National Security Strategy.[5] The United States publicizes Chinese infractions, like the construction of island military bases in the South China Sea, but does not enforce compliance. And China is playing that concern to its advantage, undertaking demonstrations of its willingness to violate U.S. sovereignty, initiating dangerous military incidents, explaining provocations as its military acting without political knowledge, and refusing to answer military hotline calls during crises. This shows that the errant notion that war happens unaccountably, that political leaders are powerless to prevent escalation, that militaries will act independently of political control and blunder states into conflict has immediate policy relevance. The idea that war happens by accident is prejudicing U.S. policy toward self-deterrence; national security experts should instead be more concerned about deliberate choices for war as they think about deterrence and escalation control.

What Is Meant by Accidental War?

It is very difficult to know with precision the combination of political commitment to objectives, military power, the ability to marshal economic resources, and the social fortitude that combatants possess until they fight. Blainey persuasively has argued that war is how relative power is determined in the international order.[6] As Carl von Clausewitz explained and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine demonstrates, war is a gambling game. If accidental war means nothing more than leaders misjudging their relative power, then every war is a mistake. This is because, as Blainey has concluded, “war is usually the outcome of a diplomatic crisis which cannot be solved because both sides have conflicting estimates of their bargaining power.”[7]

Strikingly, across nearly eighty years of the nuclear age . . . there have been few accidents, and none of them led to an automatic escalation or failure by political and military leaders to make judgments dampening the prospects of war.

To be intellectually useful, a robust definition of accidental war matters. At its most basic, accidental war could be mischance—a confused signal, the technical failure of a weapon, or the accidental launch of a missile. Alexander George has termed this kind of scenario “inadvertent war.”[8] It is striking that across nearly eighty years of the nuclear age, incorporating U.S. and Soviet arsenals in the tens of thousands and less developed countries designing indigenous arsenals and delivery systems, there have been few accidents, and none of them led to an automatic escalation or failure by political and military leaders to make judgments dampening the prospects of war.

But although scholars engaging in the debate use the terms accidental and inadvertent war interchangeably, genuine inadvertence is mostly not what is meant in the debate about accidental war; rather, mostly what is meant is willful subversion of political intent.[9] George distinguished inadvertent from accidental war, defining the latter as “one that starts because of unauthorized activities by individuals below the leadership level in the chain of command.”[10] Meanwhile, Marc Trachtenberg has defined accidental war as “one in which the political process— a process that would normally lead to a peaceful settlement of the dispute at hand—is overwhelmed by forces welling up from within the military sphere . . . If the political leaders thought the risks were relatively limited, but the military structure in place created a much greater level of risk in time of crisis, then one could conceivably have what, from the point of view of the political leadership, would be an ‘accidental war.’”[11] Scott Sagan also has narrowed the aperture of unauthorized activities to the military, defining wars as accidental only when “there would have to be some activity or incident inside the military machine, without which war would not have occurred.”[12]

The idea of accidental war has been of particular interest to political scientists rather than historians, which seems a significant detail—the experts on concepts are intrigued, the experts of the case studies find no corroborating examples. No less a source than the distinguished military historian Michael Howard has rejected the idea, writing, “if history shows any record of ‘accidental’ wars, I have yet to find them.”[13]

An exhaustive study by Evan Luard of wars dating from 1400 CE to 1985 did not turn up a single case of accidental inception.[14] Sagan, a political scientist and proponent of the accidental war idea, has admitted as much, acknowledging, “in the major works by historians on the causes of war, however, the whole idea of accidental war is either conspicuous by its absence or explicitly dismissed as conceptually confused and historically irrelevant.”[15]

### Latin America---2NC

#### No chance of great-power draw-in to Latin America.

Malamud ’20 [Andrés and Luis Schenoni; a senior research fellow at the Institute of Social Sciences of the University of Lisbon; upcoming research fellow at the University of Konstanz; Foreign Policy, “Latin America Is Off the Global Stage, and That's OK,” https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/09/10/latin-america-global-stage-imperialism-geopolitics/]

But well into the 21st century, what if Latin America is so unimportant it isn’t even on the menu? Compare it with other decolonized, developing regions. Today, Africa is home to a fifth of humanity, and demographic trends suggest it might become a serious driver of global economic growth in a couple of decades. On the flipside, extreme poverty makes it a ticking bomb, with millions of people just a boat away from aging Europe. This means that, for better or worse, Africa is becoming increasingly geopolitically relevant in the eyes of the great powers.

This assessment applies even more clearly to Asia and the Middle East. Asia is the current driver of global economic growth and hosts the only challenger to American hegemony, which is winding up in quarrels with all of its neighbors. The Middle East has the largest energy reserves in the world and remains the epicenter of violent political conflict. In contrast, Latin America is declining in both economic weight and political relevance. It offers less promise and poses a smaller threat, and therefore is unlikely to be either courted or feared. Yet, you may think, it could still be eaten.

What in Latin America could still make the great powers’ mouth water? Early in the unipolar moment, the region was still relatively special to the United States thanks to the combination of energy, migration, and cocaine. Oil from Venezuela, migrants from Mexico, and drugs from Colombia were the main concerns. Today, the United States is close to self-sufficiency in both energy and drugs, and Mexico is retaining not only its own population but Central American refugees as well.

Direct intervention has long become unnecessary. Historically the United States has intervened, either overtly or covertly, to prevent extra-regional powers from meddling in the Western Hemisphere. But this is not the case with China—and is unlikely to be. In 2016, one of us published a collective study showing how Beijing filled the void left by a diminished U.S. presence in the region without threatening U.S. strategic interests. Since then, despite heightened rhetoric about a “troika of tyranny” (of Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela) backed by Beijing, or perhaps because of it, China has turned inward and backed off on its economic statecraft.

#### The region is squarely under US heg AND isn’t relevant enough to risk war.

Malamud ’20 [Andrés and Luis Schenoni; a senior research fellow at the Institute of Social Sciences of the University of Lisbon; upcoming research fellow at the University of Konstanz; Foreign Policy, “Latin America Is Off the Global Stage, and That's OK,” https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/09/10/latin-america-global-stage-imperialism-geopolitics/]

When the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, and Panama switched recognition to China in recent years, the U.S. reaction was fierce enough to deter further defections. Some close partners in the region, such as Bolivia and Ecuador, have started to turn their back on China, and the three largest Latin American economies, Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico, have been increasingly wary of engaging in closer relations if it comes at the expense of U.S. fondness. If Venezuela remains the exception to this general realignment, its economic and humanitarian meltdown indicates to the Chinese that opportunities in Latin America are not worth the risk. Toxic food, as it were, does not make for an attractive menu.

Of course, the bipolar world we are entering poses specific challenges, not the least of which being that Latin America has been serving up the food on Chinese tables and providing the raw material for the cutlery. Mounting tensions with the United States shed a new light on the strategic importance of the region as a source of commodities—e.g., soybean, iron ore, or copper—and as a market for Chinese manufacturers. After the collapse of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, China was able to maintain free trade agreements with Chile, Costa Rica, and Peru, but negotiations with countries like Mexico and Panama stalled as trade became a battleground of great-power competition.

Similar challenges are dawning financially. Although Chinese investment has failed to keep up with that of the United States, China did become an important source of credit for Latin America in the past 20 years, its banks offering more loans to the region than the Word Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank combined—two traditional lenders through which Washington disciplined its so-called backyard in the past. Yet things have changed lately, with China lending less and more strategically to its state-owned enterprises and energy and infrastructure projects, sometimes through the Inter-American Development Bank itself—whose funding increased fourfold. This might explain Trump’s obdurate insistence in picking the new chief of the institution himself against the unwritten rule that established, at the foundation of the bank, that the president should be a Latin American citizen.

Latin America can still be internationally relevant in specific arenas, and particular cases may become problematic, but with a dwarfing economy and squarely under U.S. hegemony, the region may be less relevant globally than at any point in the past few centuries.

And yet, who said irrelevance is bad when it means being scratched off the menu?

### Russia---2NC

### Failed States---2NC

#### Failed states are total bogus AND not attributable to governance.

Woodward ’17 [Susan; 2017; Professor of Political Science at the Graduate Center for the City University of New York, Ph.D. from Princeton University; The Ideology of Failed States: Why Intervention Fails, “What’s in a Name?” Ch. 2]

The empirical problem with this concept follows directly from this theoretical vagueness. Without sufficient precision in the conceptual definition, no operational definition - how to identify an actual failed state, distinguish it from other phenomena, and measure its empirical variation - is possible.17 Where there are studies, however, the measures are superficial or, as discussed above, tautological. As Stewart Patrick, one of the few exceptions, concluded after a survey in 2006 of what he refers to as conven¬tional wisdom across all agencies of the US government, the UN, World Bank, OECD, and governments of Canada and Australia: “What is striking is how little empirical evidence underpins these assertions and policy developments. Analysts and policymakers alike have simply presumed the existence of a blanket connection.”18 By 2015, in response to the insistence by a group of nineteen countries considered failed states, the g7+, 19 that fragility should be measured as a continuum, the OECD DAC proposed a new fragility index of five separate dimensions - violence, justice, institutions, economic foundations, and resilience - that were so vague in their operational measures that it provoked immediate criticism of the blatant coding mistakes made.20

In his attempt to untangle the circularity of most statements on failed states, Patrick focused on the dependent variable, the security threats said to be caused by, in his formulation, “weak states” and, later, “precarious states.” The empirical problem, he argues, is that this category of security threats is huge. If one wants to test this causal relationship, then it is necessary to disaggregate the threats into their separate components. Treating the relationship as a case of externalities - the cross-border, spillover effects of weak states - he distinguishes six: terrorism, weapons proliferation, trafficking by organized crime and money laundering, violent conflict and complex humanitarian emergencies (the “bad neighborhood”21 phenomenon in which a country's risk of civil war has been shown to increase substantially if its neighbor is at war), pandemics and disease, and energy insecurity. He finds great variation in this first step of identifying separate patterns of association between each type of risk and weak states. Some threats are associated with weak states (e.g., proliferation of conventional weapons; but WMD, trafficking in persons or narcotics, and infectious diseases are not) whereas some are associated with strong states (terrorist activity, WMD proliferation, other kinds of trafficking such as money laundering, intellectual property theft, and cyber and environ-mental crime). The explanation for these associations lies, in some cases, with a lack of state capacity, but in others to specific policy choices by governments. Where the association can be attributed to what Patrick calls “governance challenges,” moreover, they are a necessary but not a sufficient explanation of the specific threat. Nor is the cause some vague, all-encompassing notion of failed states, but a very specific and identifiable institutional or resource weakness (such as impoverished public health services) that can then be analyzed for the appropriate policy remedy, if any.22

#### No terrorism impact. Bathtubs have a higher kill count.

Mueller ’21 [John and Mark G. Stewart; 2021; PhD, Professor Emeritus of Political Science at Ohio State University and Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute; PhD, Professor of Civil Engineering and Director of the Centre for Infrastructure Performance and Reliability at the University of Newcastle in Australia; international leader in risk assessment, public policy decision-making, and protective infrastructure for extreme hazards; Terrorism and Political Violence, “Terrorism and Bathtubs: Comparing and Assessing the Risks,” vol. 33, DOI: 10.1080/09546553.2018.1530662]

The likelihood that anyone outside a war zone will be killed by an Islamist extremist terrorist is extremely small. In the United States, for example, some six people have perished each year since 9/11 at the hands of such terrorists—for an annual fatality rate of about one in 50 million for the period.

This might be taken to suggest, as one writer has characterized it, that “terrorism is such a minor threat to American life and limb that it’s simply bizarre—just stupefyingly irrational and intellectually unserious—to suppose that it could even begin to justify the abolition of privacy rights as they have been traditionally understood in favour of the installation of a panoptic surveillance state.”1 And terrorism specialist Marc Sageman characterizes the threat terrorists present in the United States as “rather negligible.”2 The vast majority of what is commonly tallied as terrorism has occurred in war zones, and this is especially true for fatalities.3 But even this has been exaggerated by conflating terrorism with war: civil war violence that would previously have been seen to be acts of insurgency are now often labeled terrorism.4

In order to put the numbers in some context, it has often been pointed out that far more Americans are killed each year not only by such highly destructive hazards as drug overdoses or automobile accidents, but even by such comparatively minor ones as lightning, accident-causing deer, peanut allergies, or drowning in bathtubs. Some comparisons are arrayed in Table l.

In recent years, however, critics have attacked what they call "the bathtub fallacy."

First, they stress that it is important to keep in mind that bathtubs are not out to kill you while terrorism is a willful act carried out by diabolical, dedicated, and clever human beings. Thus, although the number of people Islamist terrorists have been able to kill in the West since 9/11 has thus far been quite limited, those terrorists, as they plot and plan and learn from experience, may very well become far more destructive in the future.

Second, the critics charge that the comparison of terrorism with bathtub drownings is incomplete in that it doesn't consider the possibility that the incidence of terrorist destruction is ow precisely because counterterrorism measures are so effective.

Third, it is argued that, unlike bathtub drownings, terrorism exacts costs far beyond those entailed in the event itself. It damagingly sows terror, fear, and anxiety; disturbs our psychological well-being; undermines trust and openness within the society; and reduces our sense of intrinsic moral worth even as it increases a sense of helplessness.

They maintain, fourth, that the comparison is invalid because, unlike terrorism, bath tubs provide benefit.

And finally, they contend that terrorism costs are peculiarly high, particularly in a democratic society, because the fears it generates will necessarily need to be serviced by policy makers, and this pressure forces, or inspires, them to adopt countermeasures, both foreign and domestic, that are costly and sometimes even excessive.

In this article, we examine these five propositions and find all of them to be wanting. In the process, we conclude that terrorism is rare outside war zones because, to a substantial degree, terrorists don’t exist there. In general, as with rare diseases that kill few, it makes more policy sense to expend limited funds on hazards that inflict far more damage.

Terrorism is willed and may well become more destructive

Journalist Jeffrey Goldberg has suggested that “the fear of terrorism isn’t motivated solely by what terrorists have done, but what terrorists hope to do.” Bathtubs are simply not “engaged in a conspiracy with other bathtubs to murder ever-larger numbers of Americans.” However, terrorists “in the Islamist orbit,” he insists, “seek unconventional weapons that would allow them to kill a far-larger number of Americans than died on Sept. 11.”6 Or as Janan Ganesh of the Financial Times puts it, “Bathroom deaths could multiply by 50 without a threat to civil order. The incidence of terror could not.”7

Thus far, 9/11 stands out as an extreme outlier: scarcely any terrorist act, before or after, in war zones or outside them, has inflicted even one-tenth as much total destruction. That is, contrary to common expectations, the attack has thus far been an aberration, not a harbinger.8 And al-Qaeda central, the group responsible for the attack, has, in some respects at least, proved to resemble President John Kennedy’s assassin, Lee Harvey Oswald—an entity of almost trivial proportions that got horribly lucky once. The tiny group of perhaps 100 or so does appear to have served as something of an inspiration to some Muslim extremists. They may have done some training, may have contributed a bit to the Taliban’s far larger insurgency in Afghanistan, and may have participated in a few terrorist acts in Pakistan. In his examination of the major terrorist plots against the West since 9/11, Mitchell Silber finds only two—the shoe bomber attempt of 2001 and the effort to blow up transatlantic airliners with liquid bombs in 2006—that could be said to be under the “command and control” of al-Qaeda central (as opposed to ones suggested, endorsed, or inspired by the organization), and there are questions about how full its control was even in these two instances, both of which, as it happens, failed miserably.9 And, although some al-Qaeda affiliates have committed substantial damage in the Middle East, usually in the context of civil wars, their efforts to carry out terrorism in the West have been rare and completely ineffective.10 Even under siege, it is difficult to see why al-Qaeda could not have carried out attacks at least as costly and shocking as the shooting rampages (organized by other groups) that took place in Mumbai in 2008 or at a shopping center in Kenya in 2013. Neither took huge resources, presented major logistical challenges, required the organization of a large number of perpetrators, or needed extensive planning.

However, there is of course no guarantee that things will remain that way, and the 9/11 attacks inspired the remarkable extrapolation that, because the terrorists were successful with box cutters, they might soon be able to turn out weapons of mass destruction— particularly nuclear ones—and then detonate them in an American city. For example, in his influential 2004 book, Nuclear Terrorism, Harvard’s Graham Allison relayed his “considered judgment” that “on the current path, a nuclear terrorist attack on America in the decade ahead is more likely than not.”11 Allison has had a great deal of company in his alarming pronouncements. In 2007, the distinguished physicist Richard Garwin put the likelihood of a nuclear explosion on an American or European city by terrorist or other means at 20 percent per year, which would work out to 91 percent over the eleven year period to 2018.12

Allison’s time is up, and so is Garwin’s. These oft-repeated warnings have proven to be empty. And it is important to point out that not only have terrorists failed to go nuclear, but as William Langewiesche, who has assessed the process in detail, put it in 2007, “The best information is that no one has gotten anywhere near this. I mean, if you look carefully and practically at this process, you see that it is an enormous undertaking full of risks for the would-be terrorists.”13 That process requires trusting corrupted foreign collaborators and other criminals, obtaining and transporting highly guarded material, setting up a machine shop staffed with top scientists and technicians, and rolling the heavy, cumber some, and untested finished product into position to be detonated by a skilled crew, all the while attracting no attention from outsiders.

Nor have terrorist groups been able to steal existing nuclear weapons—characteristically burdened with multiple safety devices and often stored in pieces at separate secure locales—from existing arsenals as was once much feared. And they certainly have not been able to cajole leaders in nuclear states to palm one off to them—though a war inflicting more death than Hiroshima and Nagasaki combined was launched against Iraq in 2003 in major part under the spell of fantasies about such a handover.14

More generally, the actual terrorist “adversaries” in the West scarcely deserve accolades for either dedication or prowess. It is true, of course, that sometimes even incompetents can get lucky, but such instances, however tragic, are rare. For the most part, terrorists in the United States are a confused, inadequate, incompetent, blundering, and gullible bunch, only occasionally able to get their act together. Most seem to be far better at frenetic and often self-deluded scheming than at actual execution. A summary assessment by RAND’s Brian Jenkins is apt: “their numbers remain small, their determination limp, and their competence poor.”15 And much the same holds for Europe and the rest of the developed world.16 Also working against terrorist success in the West is the fact that almost all are amateurs: they have never before tried to do something like this. Unlike criminals they have not been able to develop street smarts.

Except perhaps for the use of vehicles to deliver mayhem (though this idea is by no means new in the history of terrorism), there has been remarkably little innovation in terrorist weaponry or methodology since 9/11.17 Like their predecessors, they have continued to rely on bombs (many of which fail to detonate or do much damage) and bullets.1

### Bioterror---2NC

#### No bioterror risk.

Cross ’21 [Glenn; November 9; PhD, Former Deputy National Intelligence Officer, Weapons of Mass Destruction; War on the Rocks, “Biological Weapons in the ‘Shadow War’,” https://warontherocks.com/2021/11/biological-weapons-in-the-shadow-war/]

The threat of terrorists using biological agents exists but is very limited. The fear of nonstate actors using biological agents rose with Aum Shinrikyo’s 1995 failed efforts to spread botulinum and anthrax in Japan. Fears of bioterror reached its most recent crescendo with the 2001 anthrax letter mailings, coming as they did within weeks after the 9/11 attacks. The threat of further bioterror attacks, however, never materialized.

Despite the fact that terrorist biological weapons attacks have not materialized since the Amerithrax scare, some continue to argue that the supposed ease and lower cost of biological weapons development, production, and use along with the societal disruption of COVID-19 has incentivized bad actors to adopt biological weapons. These concerns have been echoed by others who assume that misuse is inevitable and following the COVID-19 example will result in mass casualties and crippling political, societal, and economic repercussions.

However, the bioterror threat seems to have diminished — not grown — since the 2001 Amerithrax letter mailings. The core al-Qaeda biological weapons efforts were first envisioned in the late 1990s and began in earnest shortly afterward. Yet the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan and the fall of the Taliban in late 2001 effectively disrupted al-Qaeda’s biological weapons work which largely centered on anthrax. Left without a suitable safe haven, al-Qaeda was never able to reconstitute its biological weapons efforts. The Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan, however, may result in a reemergence of al-Qaeda and its biological weapons ambitions. Time will tell whether the Taliban now will grant safe haven to al-Qaeda that could be used for biological weapons work. What is undoubted is that the Taliban and al-Qaeda have a shared history and have continued to work closely together. Without a presence in Afghanistan, U.S. intelligence will have a more difficult time detecting any resurgent al-Qaeda biological weapons efforts.

The threat of a biological weapons effort by the Islamic State in Iraq never materialized, although the group did manage to produce and use chemical weapons agents until that program was effectively disrupted. Other terrorist groups’ interest in biological weapons has been rudimentary with a focus predominately on toxins such as ricin and botulinum. U.S. domestic extremists, self-radicalized individuals, and lone actors also have gravitated toward ricin, but no known casualties have resulted from the decades-long interest in ricin.

Some analysts, however, argue that the life science revolution and global proliferation of related scientific and technical capabilities has opened a Pandora’s Box of biothreats. The argument goes that the rapid revolution in genetic engineering — including synthetic biology — the DIY bio movement, and the advent of technologies like CRISPR (acronym for “clustered regularly interspaced short palindromic repeats”) makes their misuse likely. However, as noted in the 2018 National Academies of Science report, Biodefense in the Age of Synthetic Biology, the large-scale production and delivery of biological weapons agents is inherently difficult, with biological weapons use favoring small-scale, highly targeted attacks.

### Nuclear Terror---2NC

#### No nuke terror---no interest AND too complex.

Mueller ’22 [John; 2022; Woody Hayes Chair of National Security Studies at the Mershon Center for International Security Studies, Professor Emeritus at Ohio State University; CATO Institute, “Nuclear Proliferation,” https://www.cato.org/cato-handbook-policymakers/cato-handbook-policymakers-9th-edition-2022/nuclear-proliferation]

The Prospects for Atomic Terrorism

Alarm about the possibility of nuclear weapons proliferating to terrorists has been raised repeatedly over the decades. In the wake of 9/11, many commentators were predicting that terrorists might well set one off by 2014.

Alarm has tapered some in recent years because it has become increasingly evident that terrorist groups have exhibited only limited desire and even less progress in going atomic. Perhaps, after a brief exploration of the possible routes, they have discovered that the tremendous effort required is scarcely likely to succeed.

One route a would‐​be atomic terrorist might take would be to receive or buy a bomb from a generous, like‐​minded nuclear state for delivery abroad. That route, however, is highly improbable. The risk would be too great—even for a country led by extremists—that the source of the weapon would ultimately be discovered. Moreover, the weapon could explode in a manner or on a target the donor would not approve—including, potentially, on the donor itself.

Some observers have worried about “loose nukes,” weapons that can be stolen or bought illicitly. However, Younger’s observation remains relevant: nuclear nations are very serious about the security of their weapons. Moreover, finished bombs are usually outfitted with safety devices that are difficult to defeat.

Most analysts believe that a terrorist group’s most promising route would be to attempt to make a bomb using purloined fissile material—plutonium or highly enriched uranium. However, as the Gilmore Commission—an advisory panel on terrorism and weapons of mass destruction—stressed in 1999, building and deploying a nuclear device presents “Herculean challenges.” As it noted, the process requires a lengthy sequence of steps; if each is not fully met, the result is not simply a less powerful weapon but one that can’t produce any significant nuclear yield at all or can’t be delivered.

Physicists who have studied the issue conclude that fabricating a nuclear weapon “could hardly be accomplished by a subnational group” because of “the difficulty of acquiring the necessary expertise, the technical requirements (which in several fields verge on the unfeasible), the lack of available materials and the lack of experience in working with these.” Others stress the “daunting problems associated with material purity, machining, and a host of other issues” and conclude that the notion that a terrorist group could fabricate an atomic bomb or device “is farfetched at best.”

The notion that terrorists could come up with a nuclear weapon seems remote. As with nuclear proliferation to countries, there may be reason for concern, or at least for interest and watchfulness. But alarm and hysteria are hardly called for.

### Nuclear Terror---Safe Haven---2NC

#### Safe havens don’t matter.

Pillar ’20 [Paul; May 13; nonresident senior fellow at Georgetown University’s Center for Security Studies; Cato Institute, “The American Perception of Substate Threats,” https://www.cato.org/publications/publications/american-perception-substate-threats]

The other customary worry about terrorist havens concerns not what any new regime would tolerate, but instead how terrorists would exploit disorder and lawlessness to establish such a haven. The group does what it wants to do, in other words, because the chaos of domestic conflict places it beyond the reach of any regime, domestic or foreign. That scenario presents somewhat more basis for concern because it does not postulate regimes getting into the terrorist business against their own interests, but it suffers from two other limitations. One is that although a little bit of disorder may help keep a terrorist group beyond the reach of law and government, a lot of disorder does not often help it. Terrorist organizations find it hard to operate in truly chaotic situations for the same general reasons legitimate businesses and other organizations find it hard to operate in such situations. That is why al Qaeda did not make as many inroads in Somalia as many predicted during the two decades that country was the archetypical chaotic failed state.

A second limitation is that terrorist safe havens are, quite simply, overrated. They may seize our attention as a spatially satisfying way of keeping score of how we are doing against any adversary that, like the United States, operates internationally. Among all the variables that help determine how much of a threat any one group represents, however, having a small patch of real estate is not one of the more important ones. That is all the more the case in an era of globalization and globe‐​spanning information technology in which planning, recruitment, and the direction of operations take place at least as much in virtual space as they do in physical space.19 When physical space is involved in a terrorist threat to U.S. interests, it is at least as likely to be in an apartment or mosque in a Western city (or a flight school in the United States) as on a piece of ground in some strife‐​riven land outside the West. Preparation of the most famous terrorist operation of all—9/11—is a prime example.

### North Korea---2NC

#### No Korean war---deterrence holds AND Kim’s bogged down with Russia and internal disputes.

Roy ’24 [Denny; 2024; Senior Fellow at the East-West Center in Honolulu, Ph.D. in political science at the University of Chicago; The Interpreter, “North Korea is not about to start a war,” https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/north-korea-not-about-start-war]

Alternatively, Carlin and Hecker’s analysis is far better suited to a more reasonable conclusion: that since 2019, Kim’s government has shifted its efforts, to court outside assistance in the pursuit of its security and economic objectives away from reaching agreements with the United States and South Korea and toward a closer partnership with the China/Russia Bloc. That conclusion implies continued tensions on the Korean Peninsula, but not a second Korean War.

Kim gave a lengthy speech to the DPRK legislature on January in which he elaborated about relations with South Korea. As widely reported, Kim said the DPRK will no longer work toward reunification, and will henceforth characterise the South as the “invariable principal enemy” rather than “consanguineous”. He called for revising the DPRK constitution to remove verbiage implying that North and South are parts of the same country and calling South Koreans “compatriots.”

As some analysts have pointed out, recasting South Koreans as enemies rather than cousins might reduce the psychological dissonance that would accompany a decision to go to war. For decades up to now, however, Pyongyang’s official policy of striving for reunification did not prevent the DPRK government from making threats of mass violence against South Koreans (see, for example, the threat make Seoul a “sea of fire”).

Kim Jong-un would not be sending stocks of ammunition and missiles to Russia if he planned to fight a war on the Peninsula in the immediate future.

Furthermore, in the same speech, Kim said plainly that he does not plan to start a war. “We will never unilaterally unleash a war if the enemies do not provoke us,” he said. “There is no reason to opt for war, and therefore, there is no intention of unilaterally going to war.”

Kim says the policy change on reunification is a reaction to an “escalation” in hostility from the DPRK’s adversaries. He specifically cites South Korean discussion about the possible “collapse” of the North Korean state, “remarks made by the US authorities about the ‘end of our regime’”, US-South Korea joint military exercises, the US policy of nuclear-weapons-capable platforms regularly visiting South Korea, and enhanced trilateral cooperation between the United States, South Korea and hated Japan. Relatedly, South Korea has announced it is building a capability to pre-emptively kill Kim and other top North Korea officials. Pyongyang’s seemingly warlike behaviour is partly reactive.

We don’t need to rely on Kim’s word. He would not be sending stocks of ammunition and missiles to Russia if he planned to fight a war on the Peninsula in the immediate future.

An even stronger reason to doubt the Carlin-Hecker thesis is this: the combined forces of the United States and South Korea give them overwhelming military superiority over the DPRK at both the conventional and nuclear levels.

This year will see important elections in both the United States and South Korea. A return of Donald Trump to the White House is possible. Pyongyang might hope that a sharp jolt will force an overstretched Washington to return to negotiations ready to offer concessions, such as relief from economic sanctions, to reduce the number of global hotspots. Therefore, it might make sense for Kim to order a lethal military action as a means of gaining political leverage – but only if he was confident Seoul and Washington would understand the attack as limited and isolated.

This leads to an important observation: it is likely that much of the credibility of the Carlin-Hecker thesis rests on the widely-held but questionable assumption that Kim’s decision-making is “erratic,” and therefore need not make sense.

Kim needs to deter his enemies, which explains his military build-up and missile tests. He fears political contamination from South Korea, which may have pushed him to make official his de facto non-reunification policy. Welcoming a general war, however, would not solve any of Kim’s problems.